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 The current scholarly focus on informal con-
stitutional amendment has obscured the continu-
ing relevance of formal amendment rules. In this 
article, I return our attention to formal amend-
ment in order to show that formal amendment 
rules—not formal amendments but formal 
amendment rules themselves—perform an un-
derappreciated function: to express constitutional 
values. Drawing from national constitutions, in 
particular the Canadian, South African, German, 
and United States constitutions, I illustrate how 
constitutional designers may deploy formal 
amendment rules to create a formal constitutional 
hierarchy that reflects special political commit-
ments. That formal amendment rules may express 
constitutional values is both a clarifying and a 
complicating contribution to their study. This the-
sis clarifies the study of formal amendment rules 
by showing that such rules may serve a function 
that scholars have yet to attribute to them; yet it 
complicates this study by indicating that the con-
stitutional text alone cannot prove whether the 
constitutional values expressed in formal amend-
ment rules represent authentic or inauthentic po-
litical commitments. 
L’accent académique actuel sur l’amende-
ment informel d’une constitution a obscurci la per-
tinence continue de la procédure formelle d’amen-
dement. Dans cet article, je rapporte notre atten-
tion sur l’amendement formel pour montrer que la 
procédure formelle (non pas la modification, mais 
la procédure elle-même) remplit un rôle sous-
évalué : l’expression des valeurs constitutionnelles. 
En m’appuyant sur des constitutions nationales, en 
particulier celles du Canada, de l’Afrique du Sud, 
de l’Allemagne et des États-Unis, je démontre que 
les auteurs insèrent parfois des règles formelles 
d’amendement pour créer une formelle hiérarchie 
qui reflète des engagements particuliers de nature 
politique. L’expression possible des valeurs consti-
tutionnelles faite par des règles formelles d’amen-
dement est une contribution qui clarifie et com-
plique leur étude. Cette conclusion clarifie l’étude 
des règles formelles d’amendement en montrant 
que de telles règles peuvent servir à une fonction 
que les érudits n’y ont pas encore attribué. Cepen-
dant, elle complique cette étude en indiquant que 
le texte constitutionnel seul est incapable de prou-
ver si les valeurs constitutionnelles exprimées dans 
les règles formelles d’amendement représentent 
des engagements de nature politique, qu’ils soient 
authentiques ou inauthentiques.  
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Introduction 
 Formal constitutional amendment rules are largely corrective. Recog-
nizing that a deficient constitution risks building error upon error until 
the only effective repair becomes revolution,1 constitutional designers en-
trench formal amendment rules that can be used to peacefully correct the 
constitution’s design.2 Fixing defects is therefore an essential function of 
formal amendment rules. Political actors generally deploy formal 
amendment rules to “amend” a constitution—from the Latin verb 
“emendare”—in order to “free [it] from fault” or to “put [it] right.”3 Yet 
formal amendment rules do more than entrench a procedure for perfect-
ing apparent imperfections in the written constitution: they may also 
serve the underappreciated function of expressing constitutional values. 
 Much of the current scholarship on constitutional amendment ex-
plores informal amendment.4 This focus, while important, has obscured 
the continuing relevance of formal amendment rules. Consider formal and 
                                                  
1   Karl Loewenstein, “Reflections on the Value of Constitutions in Our Revolutionary Age” 
in Arnold J Zurcher, ed, Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War II 
(New York: New York University Press, 1951) 191 at 215. 
2   John W Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law I: Sovereignty 
and Liberty (Boston: Ginn & Co, 1893) at 137. 
3   Bryan A Garner, Modern American Usage, 3d ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009) at 41. 
4   An informal amendment occurs “when political norms change, or courts (possibly re-
sponding to political pressures) ‘interpret’ or construct the constitution so as to bring it 
in line with policy preferences” (Tom Ginsburg & Eric A Posner, “Subsconstitutional-
ism” (2010) 62:6 Stan L Rev 1583 at 1600). There is vast body of scholarship on informal 
amendment. See e.g. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 1: Foundations (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 1991) at 266; Bruce Ackerman, We the People 2: Transformations (Cam-
bridge: Belknap Press, 1998) at 383–420; Jeremy Webber, Reimagining Canada: Lan-
guage, Culture, Community, and the Canadian Constitution (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1994) at 260–305; David A Strauss, The Living Constitution (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 120–39; Charlie Jeffery, “Dimensions of Consti-
tutional Change: Germany and the United Kingdom Compared” in Arthur B Gunlicks, 
ed, German Public Policy and Federalism: Current Debates on Political, Legal, and So-
cial Issues (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003) 197 at 203; Stephen M Griffin, “Constit-
uent Power and Constitutional Change in American Constitutionalism” in Martin 
Loughlin & Neil Walker, eds, The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and 
Constitutional Form (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) 49 at 52–61; see also 
SN Ray, Modern Comparative Politics: Approaches, Methods and Issues, 3d ed (Delhi: 
Prentice-Hall of India, 2004) at 117–31 (discussing formal and informal amendment in 
comparative perspective); Brannon P Denning, “Means to Amend: Theories of Constitu-
tional Change” (1997) 65:1 Tenn L Rev 155 at 180–209 (surveying theories of informal 
amendment); Heather K Gerken, “The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skepti-
cal Response to Our Undemocratic Constitution” (2007) 55:4 Drake L Rev 925 at 929–33 
(cataloguing recent scholarship on informal constitutional amendment); see generally 
Sanford Levinson, ed, Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitu-
tional Amendment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) (compiling essays on 
constitutional change, both formal and informal) [Levinson, Responding]. 
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informal amendment practices in the United States. Today it is difficult,5 
if not virtually inconceivable,6 to gather the supermajorities needed to 
formally amend the United States Constitution pursuant to Article V.7 
That there have been only twenty-seven textual additions to the Constitu-
tion since 1789—and of those, ten were packaged as the Bill of Rights—
reveals just how rarely political actors have resorted to the constitution’s 
formal amendment procedures.8 Spurred by the difficulty of constitutional 
change through Article V,9  political actors have innovated alternative 
methods to keep current the centuries-old constitution.10 Today, informal 
amendment prevails so predominantly over formal amendment that Arti-
cle V amendments have been described as irrelevant.11 But while Article 
V amendments may perhaps be irrelevant, Article V itself is not. 
 Like other formal amendment rules, Article V entrenches special polit-
ical commitments. We can discern from Article V’s equal suffrage clause, 
                                                  
5   See Barry Friedman & Scott B Smith, “The Sedimentary Constitution” (1998) 147:1 U 
Pa L Rev 1 at 45; David E Kyvig, “Arranging for Amendment: Unintended Outcomes of 
Constitutional Design” in David E Kyvig, ed, Unintended Consequences of Constitution-
al Amendment (Athens: Univeristy of Georgia Press, 2000) 9 at 10–11. 
6   See Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes 
Wrong (And How We the People Can Correct It), 2d ed (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006) at 21; Stephen M Griffin, “The Nominee is ... Article V” (1995) 12:2 Const 
Commentary 171 at 172. 
7   US Const art V:  
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, 
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the 
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for 
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents 
and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures 
of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths 
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the 
Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the 
Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the 
first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no 
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Sen-
ate. 
8   See William B Fisch, “Constitutional Referendum in the United States of America” 
(2006) 54:4 Am J Comp L (supplement) 485 at 490–91. 
9   See e.g. William E Scheuerman, “Constitutionalism in an Age of Speed” (2002) 19:2 
Const Commentary 353 at 374–75; Donald S Lutz, “Toward a Theory of Constitutional 
Amendment” (1994) 88:2 Am Pol Sci Rev 355 at 364. 
10   See Adam M Samaha, “Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation” 
(2008) 108:1 Colum L Rev 606 at 618. 
11   See generally David A Strauss, “The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments” (2001) 
114:5 Harv L Rev 1457 at 1460. 
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as well as its reference to the importation12 and census-based taxation13 
clauses, that federalism is an historically important constitutional value 
in the United States. Germany’s formal amendment rules similarly reflect 
that state’s constitutional values—specifically the value of human dignity, 
which is absolutely entrenched against formal amendment in the German 
Basic Law.14 We may also look to the Canadian and South African consti-
tutions for evidence that formal amendment rules express constitutional 
values. Much like the formal amendment rules in the United States Con-
stitution and the German Basic Law, the design of these rules in the Ca-
nadian and South African constitutions is more than simply corrective. As 
I will show,15 their formal amendment rules entrench a constitutional hi-
erarchy that reflects a rank-ordering of constitutional values.16  
 In this article, I advance the scholarship on constitutional amendment 
by showing that formal amendment rules—not formal amendments, but 
the rules pursuant to which formal amendments themselves are made—
express constitutional values. My thesis is neither that formal amend-
ment rules always express constitutional values nor that designers neces-
sarily intend formal amendment rules to serve this function. It is instead 
that formal amendment rules are one of the sites where constitutional de-
signers may express a polity’s constitutional values, both internally to the 
persons who are nominally or actually bound by its terms, and externally 
to the larger world. This article generates a research agenda for further 
inquiry into the use of formal amendment rules to express values. 
 This is a useful contribution to the study of formal amendment be-
cause it both clarifies and complicates their study. It clarifies it by demon-
strating that formal amendment rules serve the underappreciated func-
tion of expressing constitutional values; yet it also complicates it by 
stressing that it is not always clear whether the constitutional values en-
trenched in formal amendment rules express authentic or inauthentic po-
                                                  
12   “The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall 
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one 
thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importa-
tion, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person” (US Const, supra note 7, art I, s 9). 
13   “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or 
enumeration herein before directed to be taken” (ibid). 
14   Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949, translated by U.S. Department of 
State, arts 1(1) (“the dignity of man shall be inviolable”), 79(3) (absolutely entrenching 
article 1(1) against formal amendment) [Basic Law]. 
15   See Parts II–III, below. 
16   See Constitution Act, 1982, ss 38–49, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 
1982, c 11 [Constitution Act, 1982]; Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
No 108 of 1996, s 74 [Constitution of South Africa]. 
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litical commitments. This has important implications for constitutional 
design. 
 I begin, in Part I, by identifying and explaining the functions scholars 
have generally attributed to formal amendment rules; I show that none of 
these functions fully accounts for the expressive nature of formal amend-
ment rules. In Part II, I draw from a number of national constitutions, in-
cluding the constitutions of Canada and South Africa, to illustrate how 
formal amendment rules may entrench and express constitutional values 
by creating a formal constitutional hierarchy. Part III confronts an ana-
lytical difficulty: the values that constitutional designers choose to en-
trench in formal amendment rules may reflect either actual or inauthen-
tic political commitments. Using the German Basic Law as a model, I ex-
plain how we may discern whether entrenched constitutional values rep-
resent authentic political commitments. I suggest that the authenticity of 
the constitutional values entrenched in Germany’s formal amendment 
rules derives from their validation by the Constitutional Court, their cen-
trality to German political culture, and their entrenchment in the Basic 
Law. I conclude with additional thoughts for deepening the comparative 
study of formal amendment rules. 
I. The Functions of Constitutional Amendment Rules 
 Few tasks in constitutional design are more important than structur-
ing formal amendment rules.17 Scholars have attributed several functions 
to formal amendment rules. Scholars generally understand these rules as 
managing political action and regulating constitutional change: “Amend-
ing formulas set up mechanisms that endeavor to tame constitutional ac-
tors and encapsulate the relationship between the constitution and the 
passage of time.”18 More specifically, formal amendment rules are said to 
distinguish a constitution from ordinary law, to structure the formal 
amendment process, to “precommit”19 future political actors, and to facili-
tate improvements or corrections to the constitutional text.20 They also 
heighten public awareness, check political branches, promote democracy, 
                                                  
17   See Sanford Levinson, “Designing an Amendment Process” in John Ferejohn, Jack N 
Rakove & Jonathan Riley, eds, Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 271 at 275. 
18   Xenophon Contiades & Alkmene Fotiadou, “Models of Constitutional Change” in Xeno-
phon Contiades, ed, Engineering Constitutional Change: A Comparative Perspective on 
Europe, Canada and the USA (New York: Routledge, 2013) 417 at 431. 
19   See Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Con-
straints (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
20   See Part I.A, below. 
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and pacify constitutional change.21 Formal amendment rules do indeed 
serve each of these functions, as I will explain in this Part. But they 
should also be understood as one of several sites where constitutional de-
signers may entrench and thereby express constitutional values. None of 
the functions scholars have attributed to them adequately reflects this 
expressive role. 
A. Why Entrench Formal Amendment Rules? 
 First, as a basic matter, formal amendment rules distinguish constitu-
tional text from ordinary legislation. Whereas laws are ordinarily subject 
to repeal or amendment by a simple legislative majority, a constitutional 
text is often subject to a higher threshold for alteration.22 This higher 
threshold could be approval by a legislative or popular supermajority, and 
it sometimes requires both. 23  More demanding procedures for formal 
amendment reflect both the relatively higher significance afforded to con-
stitutions over laws and the view that ordinary law is derivative of consti-
tutional law.24 However, designing formal amendment rules so as to re-
tain a constitution’s distinction from ordinary law may be easier said than 
done, because it requires pinpointing precisely the right level of amend-
                                                  
21   Ibid. 
22   See András Sajó, Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism (New 
York: Central European University Press, 1999) at 39–40; Carl Schmitt, Constitutional 
Theory, ed and translated by Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008) at 
71–72; Edward Schneier, Crafting Constitutional Democracies: The Politics of Institu-
tional Design (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) at 222. Although constitutions 
are generally subject to higher thresholds for repeal or formal amendment than are or-
dinary laws, it is nonetheless possible to make it feasible to repeal constitutions by sim-
ple majority vote, just as ordinary laws may themselves be entrenched against repeal 
by simple majority vote. See Larry Alexander, “Constitutions, Judicial Review, Moral 
Rights, and Democracy: Disentangling the Issues” in Grant Huscroft, ed, Expounding 
the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) 119 at 120. 
23   See Jan-Erik Lane, Constitutions and Political Theory, 2d ed (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2011) at 41. Formal amendment rules may also be designed to deny 
popular majorities the power of constitutional amendment by conferring that power ex-
clusively upon political actors. See Joel I Colón-Ríos, Weak Constitutionalism: Demo-
cratic Legitimacy and the Question of Constituent Power (London, UK: Routledge, 2012) 
at 4. Formal amendment rules may similarly be designed to prevent fleeting majorities 
from making significant constitutional changes. See Geoffrey de Q Walker, The Rule of 
Law: Foundation of Constitutional Democracy (Carlton, Austl: Melbourne University 
Press, 1988) at 381. 
24   See Donald S Lutz, “Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment” in Levinson, Re-
sponding, supra note 4, 237 at 240 [Lutz, “Theory”]. 
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ment difficulty.25 The higher the frequency of formal amendment, the 
more the constitution may seem like an ordinary law.26 
 Second, scholars have observed that formal amendment rules struc-
ture the process by which political actors change the text and meaning of 
a constitution. Formal amendment rules provide a legal and transparent 
framework within which to alter the constitution,27  whereas informal 
amendment occurs arguably pursuant to extralegal procedures.28 To call 
informal amendment extralegal is not to make a claim about its legitima-
cy. As Bruce Ackerman has argued, there exist informal—though none-
theless proper—procedures beyond those expressly detailed in Article V to 
amend the United States Constitution.29 To describe informal amendment 
procedures as “extralegal” and formal amendment rules as “legal” is 
therefore only to highlight that informal amendment procedures are not 
outlined in a constitutional text, in contrast to formal amendment rules, 
which are entrenched within it. 
                                                  
25   See John R Vile, Contemporary Questions Surrounding the Constitutional Amending 
Process (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1993) at 2; Leslie Wolf-Phillips, “Introduction” in 
Leslie Wolf-Phillips, ed, Constitutions of Modern States: Selected Texts and Commen-
tary (New York: Praeger, 1968) at xxv. 
26   See Kathleen Sullivan, “Constitutional Amendmentitis”, online: (1995) The American 
Prospect at 22–23 <www.prospect.org>. 
27   See Vivien Hart, “Democratic Constitution Making”, online: (2003) 107 United States 
Institute of Peace Special Report 1 at 4. 
28   See Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden, “Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denom-
inator Problem” in Tom Ginsburg, ed, Comparative Constitutional Design (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012) 195 at 195. Akhil Amar has argued that Article V of 
the United States Constitution does not provide the only way to formally amend the 
text. His argument—that a majority of Americans may, by referendum, amend the 
Constitution—is a novel view on extralegal, yet nonetheless formal, constitutional 
amendment. See Akhil Reed Amar, “Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitu-
tion Outside Article V” (1988) 55:4 U Chicago L Rev 1043 at 1060. 
29   Bruce A Ackerman, “Transformative Appointments” (1988) 101:6 Harv L Rev 1164 at 
1179; see also sources catalogued in Levinson, Responding, supra note 4 (compiling 
sources on informal amendment in both the United States and elsewhere). For critiques 
of Ackerman’s theory of informal amendment, see e.g. James E Fleming, “We the Un-
conventional American People” (1998) 65:4 U Chicago L Rev 1513; Michael J Klarman, 
“Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of 
Constitutional Moments” (1992) 44:3 Stan L Rev 759; Larry Kramer, “What’s a Consti-
tution for Anyway? Of History and Theory, Bruce Ackerman and the New Deal” (1996) 
46:3 Case W Res L Rev 885; Gerald N Rosenberg, “The Unconventional Conventional-
ist” (1999) 2:2 Green Bag (2d) 209; Frederick Schauer, “Deliberating About Delibera-
tion” (1992) 90:6 Mich L Rev 1187; Suzanna Sherry, “The Ghost of Liberalism Past” 
(1992) 105:4 Harv L Rev 918; Laurence H Tribe, “Taking Text and Structure Seriously: 
Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation” (1995) 108:6 Harv L 
Rev 1221. 
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 Third, formal amendment rules precommit future political actors to 
the entrenched choices of the constitution’s authors. The strongest “pre-
commitment” device is a subject-matter restriction on formal amendment, 
which constitutional designers entrench to privilege something in the con-
stitutional design by making it unamendable.30 To borrow from Sanford 
Levinson, a formally unamendable constitution would reflect constitu-
tional designers’ “inordinate confidence in their own political wisdom cou-
pled perhaps with an equally inordinate lack of confidence in successor 
generations.”31 Constitutional designers may also distrust political actors 
and consequently create formal amendment rules to limit their future 
choices.32 Lawrence Sager makes plain this connection between precom-
mitment and distrust, arguing that constitutional designers make consti-
tutions difficult to amend because “[w]e trust ourselves, perhaps, but not 
those who will succeed us in stewardship of our political community.”33 
The most important devices to foster precommitment, according to Jon 
Elster, are supermajorities and delays.34  
 Fourth, scholars have explained that formal amendment rules offer a 
way to improve the design of a constitution by correcting the faults that 
time and experience reveal. Brannon Denning and John Vile have made 
this point persuasively: 
If the nation is to continue with a written constitution that contains 
the specificity of some of the provisions of the existing document, 
there will be times when, absent flagrant disregard for constitution-
al language, some amendments will be required as defects become 
apparent, or changes are desired.35 
Amendment procedures allow political actors to respond to the changing 
political, social, and economic needs of the political community36—needs 
                                                  
30   See Jon Elster, “Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction” (1991) 58:2 U 
Chicago L Rev 447 at 471. 
31   Sanford Levinson, “The Political Implications of Amending Clauses” (1996) 13:1 Const 
Commentary 107 at 112 [Levinson, “Amending Clauses”]. 
32   See Donald J Boudreaux & A C Pritchard, “Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic 
Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process” (1993) 62:1 Fordham L Rev 111 at 
123–24. 
33   Lawrence G Sager, “The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution” in Ferejohn, Rakove 
& Riley, supra note 17, 110 at 124. 
34   Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 104. 
35   Brannon P Denning & John R Vile, “The Relevance of Constitutional Amendments: A 
Response to David Strauss” (2002) 77:1 Tul L Rev 247 at 275. 
36   See Gabriel L Negretto, “Toward a Theory of Formal Constitutional Change: Mecha-
nisms of Constitutional Adaptation in Latin America” in Detlef Nolte & Almut Schil-
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that the governing constitution may inadequately serve, whether as a re-
sult of suboptimal constitutional design or new social circumstances.37 
Formal amendment rules therefore operate against the backdrop of hu-
man error and exist to redress shortcomings in the design of the constitu-
tion itself.38  
 Formal amendment rules also heighten public awareness and deliber-
ation. They invite political actors to debate and negotiate publicly about 
what they believe best serves the common interest, and they “ensure that 
society acts on well-founded and stable expectations about the conse-
quences” of amending a constitution.39 Formal amendment rules, which 
commonly require some form of supermajority action, “promote careful 
consideration of the issues ... by forcing those in favor of a particular 
proposition to persuade a larger segment of the population.”40 Therefore, 
for Donald Lutz, formal amendment rules are means “[t]o arrive at the 
best possible decisions in pursuit of the common good under a condition of 
popular sovereignty.”41 The product of this public deliberation—a formal 
amendment inscribed in the text of a constitution—in turn makes possible 
the publication and reinforcement of constitutional norms. Formal 
amendment, write Denning and Vile, “undeniably changes the Constitu-
tion in one significant respect: it adds language to the Constitution.”42 As 
a result, “[t]he publicity accompanying the change may, in fact, increase 
public expectations that the change will be honored by the other branches 
[of government], raising the costs of evasion or under-enforcement.”43  
 Sixth, formal amendment rules also act as a check between branches 
of government. They give political actors a mechanism to revise the in-
formal constitutional amendments entrenched by courts of last resort in 
      
ling-Vacaflor, eds, New Constitutionalism in Latin America: Promises and Practices 
(Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2012) 51 at 52. 
37   See Raymond Ku, “Consensus of the Governed: The Legitimacy of Constitutional 
Change” (1995) 64:2 Fordham L Rev 535 at 542. 
38   See Bjørn Erik Rasch & Roger D Congleton, “Amendment Procedures and Constitu-
tional Stability” in Roger D Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg, eds, Democratic Consti-
tutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence (Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press, 2006) 319 at 326. 
39   Ibid at 327. 
40   Ku, supra note 37 at 571. 
41   Lutz, “Theory”, supra note 24 at 239–40. 
42   Denning & Vile, supra note 35 at 279. 
43   Ibid. 
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the course of constitutional interpretation.44 Rosalind Dixon observes that 
formal amendment rules allow political actors both to move courts toward 
new constitutional interpretations and to trump courts’ constitutional 
judgments.45 Interestingly, however, formal amendment rules may also 
have the opposite effect depending on their rigidity. The more exacting 
the process of consummating a formal amendment, the more insulated 
from reversal by amendment the judiciary’s constitutional judgments be-
come; conversely, the less burdensome the formal amendment process, 
the greater the power held by political actors to shape and reshape consti-
tutional meaning.46 The durability of judicial judgments is therefore di-
rectly proportional to the rigidity of formal amendment. 
 Scholars have also pointed to the democracy-promoting function of 
formal amendment rules. The right to amend a constitution is, above all, 
a right to democratic choice. Perhaps most prominently on this point, Jed 
Rubenfeld has argued that “[t]he very principle that gives the [US] Con-
stitution legitimate authority—the principle of self-government over 
time—requires that a nation be able to reject any part of a constitution 
whose commitments are no longer the people’s own.”47 Rubenfeld con-
cludes that “[t]hus written constitutionalism requires a process not only of 
popular constitution-writing, but also of popular constitution-rewriting.”48 
In addition to promoting the majoritarian bases of democracy, formal 
amendment rules may also promote the substantive dimensions of democ-
racy, namely its counter-majoritarian and minority-protecting purposes. 
As Roger Congleton explains, formal amendment rules “support the rule 
of law insofar as constitutional stability is increased and/or minority pro-
tections are enhanced.”49 
 Finally, scholars also interpret formal amendment rules as making 
possible sweeping but non-violent political transformations. This pacifying 
function is perhaps best articulated by Walter Dellinger, who posits that 
                                                  
44   See Andrée Lajoie & Henry Quillinan, “Emerging Constitutional Norms: Continuous 
Judicial Amendment of the Constitution—The Proportionality Test as a Moving Tar-
get” (1992) 55:1 L & Contemp Probs 285 at 285. 
45   Rosalind Dixon, “Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative Perspective” in 
Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon, eds, Comparative Constitutional Law (Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar, 2011) 96 at 98. 
46   Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-
Six Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999) at 228–30. 
47   Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional Self-Government (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2001) at 174. 
48   Ibid. 
49   Roger D Congleton, Perfecting Parliament: Constitutional Reform, Liberalism, and the 
Rise of Western Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 287. 
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the Article V amendment process in the United States Constitution “rep-
resents a domestication of the right to revolution.”50 Entrenching the rules 
of formal amendment in a constitutional text provides a roadmap for ef-
fecting constitutional changes that range from modest to major, without 
having to write an entirely new constitution, resort to irregular methods 
of constitutional renewal, or take up arms. In the United States at the 
Federal Convention of 1787, George Mason echoed this very point, recog-
nizing that constitutional amendments would be inevitable but that “it 
will be better to provide for them, in an easy, regular and Constitutional 
way than to trust to chance and violence.”51 This function fosters a higher 
probability of constitutionally continuous—rather than constitutionally 
discontinuous52—change under formal amendment rules. As Dixon ex-
plains, formal amendment rules “increase the chances that such change 
will occur (at least more or less) within existing constitutional frame-
works, rather than via processes of whole-scale constitutional revision or 
overthrow.”53 
B. Values in the Constitutional Text 
 Formal amendment rules certainly do serve each of the eight functions 
that scholars have attributed to them. But they also have an additional 
function: to express constitutional values. Although some have suggested 
or recognized this claim, none has yet to fully develop the thesis that for-
mal amendment rules either expressly declare or more subtly signal con-
stitutional values. Samuel Finer, Vernon Bogdanor, and Bernard Rudden 
make this point most directly when they state in their important compar-
ative study of constitutions that formal amendment rules “may express 
basic values.”54 But these scholars mention this only in passing, without 
further development, and only in reference to unamendable constitutional 
provisions. As I will show in the pages to follow, unamendable provisions 
                                                  
50   Walter Dellinger, “The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amend-
ment Process” (1983) 97:2 Harv L Rev 386 at 431. 
51   Max Farrand, ed, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, revised ed (New Ha-
ven: Yale University Press, 1966) vol 1 at 203. 
52   Constitutional change is continuous where it occurs under the authority of the existing 
constitution and does not result in a new regime; in contrast, constitutional change is 
discontinuous where it does not occur under this authority. See Peter Suber, The Para-
dox of Self-Amendment: A Study of Logic, Law, Omnipotence, and Change (New York: 
Peter Lang, 1990) at 18. 
53   Dixon, supra note 45 at 97. 
54   SE Finer, Vernon Bogdanor & Bernard Rudden, Comparing Constitutions (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995) at 13. 
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are not the only formal amendment rules that may express constitutional 
values.55 
 Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein have made a similar observation. 
In their constitutional design scholarship advising new democracies how 
to structure their formal amendment rules, they explore both the tension 
between liberalism and democracy in designing formal amendment rules 
and the consequences for democracy of adopting stringent formal rules. 
Holmes and Sunstein argue that the procedures used to formally amend a 
constitution “[shed] light on the variety of theories underlying different 
liberal democracies.”56 They conclude that formal amendment rules “[help] 
us identify the broad norms and basic commitments behind the constitu-
tional fine print.”57  
 Others have suggested more indirectly that formal amendment rules 
may be used to express constitutional values. Levinson, for example, has 
observed that Article V of the United States Constitution “varies the diffi-
culty of the amendment process with the perceived importance of given is-
sues,” referring specifically to the equal suffrage clause.58 For their part, 
Denning and Vile have developed the notion of “[t]he [p]ublicity [f]unction 
of [w]ritten [a]mendments.”59 But their focus has been on formal amend-
ments themselves, not on the rules for their entrenchment. Dixon has 
noted that “various countries have established various distinct tracks for 
constitutional amendment that vary according to the subject-matter of a 
proposed amendment,” with specific reference to India and South Africa.60 
But these scholars have yet to explain and illustrate how formal amend-
ment rules may actually express constitutional values. 
 Constitutional scholars have long argued, however, that constitutions 
may serve an expressive function. Some constitutions are written to re-
flect the meta-constitutional norms that bind a constitutional community 
and distinguish this particular community from others. Mark Tushnet ex-
plains that constitutions, both in their entrenched institutional arrange-
ments and in the doctrines that emerge from their interpretation, “are 
ways in which a nation goes about defining itself.”61 As Tom Ginsburg has 
                                                  
55   See Part II.C, below.  
56   Stephen Holmes & Cass R Sunstein, “The Politics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern 
Europe” in Levinson, Responding, supra note 4, 275 at 278–79. 
57   Ibid at 279. 
58   Levinson, “Amending Clauses”, supra note 28 at 122. 
59   Denning & Vile, supra note 35 at 279. 
60   Dixon, supra note 45 at 103. 
61   Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights 
in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) at 12. 
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observed, “[i]n some polities, constitutions reflect and sometimes even 
create a shared consciousness, and so overcome regional or ethnic divi-
sions.”62 He adds that “[t]he symbolic or expressive function of constitu-
tions emphasizes the particularity of constitution-making. It is We the 
People that come together, and so the constitution embodies our nation in 
a distinct and local way different from other polities.”63 Constitutions may 
therefore express values with the aspirational or functional purposes of 
self-definition and nation building.64 
 Constitutions may also express values without exerting any immedi-
ate or perceptible legal effect. Sunstein has observed that constitutional 
provisions make statements about a nation’s objectives and aspirations, 
and that some may attribute significance to such statements even if the 
consequences of those statements are unclear.65 He cites as an example an 
anti-discrimination norm upon which a society might insist “for expres-
sive reasons even if [that society] does not know whether the law actually 
helps members of minority groups.” He continues: 
The point bears on the cultural role of law, adjudication, and even of 
Constitutional Court decisions. When the Court makes a decision, it 
is often taken to be speaking on behalf of the nation’s basic princi-
ples and commitments. This is a matter of importance quite apart 
from consequences, conventionally understood.66 
Expression, then, is distinct from prohibition or authorization. 
 The values of a constitution reflect what Gary Jacobsohn calls the con-
stitution’s identity.67 To discern a constitution’s identity, the first though 
not the only place to look is its text.68 The “writtenness”69 of a constitution 
                                                  
62   Tom Ginsburg, “Written Constitutions and the Administrative State: On the Constitu-
tional Character of Administrative Law” in Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L Lindseth, 
eds, Comparative Administrative Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010) 117 at 118. 
63   Ibid. 
64   But see Sanford Levinson, “‘The Constitution’ in American Civil Religion” [1979] Sup Ct 
Rev 123 (questioning whether the United States Constitution can serve as a source of 
national unity: “[i]t is ironic that a culture which has experienced a centuries-long ‘mel-
ancholy, long-withdrawing roar’ from religious faith can believe so blithely in the con-
tinuing reality of a collectivity of citizens organized around a constitutional faith” at 
150–51). 
65   Cass R Sunstein, “On the Expressive Function of Law” (1996) 5:1 E Eur Const Rev 66 
at 67. 
66   Ibid. 
67   Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 2010) at 348. 
68   See ibid. 
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serves in part to codify a society’s fundamental ideals and structures;70 
but their codification and attendant interpretation need not remain static: 
they may change over time.71 This is to be expected since, as Mary Ann 
Glendon has explained in her comparative study of abortion and divorce, 
“law, in addition to all the other things it does, tells stories about the cul-
ture that helped to shape it and which it in turn helps to shape: stories 
about who we are, where we came from, and where we are going.”72 These 
stories, which we may broadly understand as representing the values held 
within a community, “seem to have a powerful influence not only on how 
legal norms are invented and applied within that system, but on how facts 
are perceived and translated into the language and concepts of the law.”73 
To deconstruct the metaphor, the values expressed by and in law filter 
throughout the legal system. 
II. Constitutional Values and Formal Amendment Rules 
 Constitutional values are the foundation of any constitutional regime. 
They help us rank the regime’s rules, principles, and institutional ar-
rangements relative to each other in a hierarchical order.74 They inform 
the choices political actors make and how judges interpret the constitu-
tion, and they may also reflect how a regime defines itself, both internally 
and externally. Constitutional values are the equivalent of a trump card 
in constitutional adjudication: where a constitutional value is set against 
a non-constitutional value, the constitutional value will prevail in a con-
flict against the non-constitutional value of efficiency. Constitutional val-
ues may moreover be both preservative and aspirational: they may seek 
to preserve something about the structure of the state—for instance, fed-
eralism or republicanism—just as they may aspire to an ideal that is im-
      
69   See Andrew B Coan, “The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation” 
(2010) 158:4 U Pa L Rev 1025. 
70   See Thomas C Grey, “The Constitution as Scripture” (1984) 37:1 Stan L Rev 1 at 16. 
71   For a discussion of the evolution of the United States Constitution as a symbol since its 
adoption, see Max Lerner, “Constitution and Court as Symbols” (1937) 46:8 Yale LJ 
1290 at 1294–1305. 
72   Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1987) at 8. 
73   Ibid.  
74   See Walter F Murphy, “Slaughter-House, Civil Rights, and Limits on Constitutional 
Change” (1987) 32 Am J Juris 1 at 22. 
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perfectly attainable but nonetheless deemed worth pursuing—for exam-
ple, liberty or equality.75 
A. Creating a Constitutional Hierarchy 
 Constitutional values are contestable, however, for at least two rea-
sons. First, the content of constitutional values may be contested because 
they are commonly stated at a high level of generality. This invites com-
peting interpretations of such values as justice, fairness, or the rule of 
law.76 Second, the actual identity of constitutional values may be contest-
ed because it is unclear how we are to identify which values do, or should, 
prevail in a constitutional community where those values are not express-
ly identified in a constitutional text.77 Were it even possible to agree on a 
set of values, the challenge of mediating among them would remain. 
Where one value collides with another, the governing one may be difficult 
to predict without reference to an authoritative predetermined hierarchy 
of values, whether formally or informally entrenched. 
 Constitutional theory can help create a hierarchy of constitutional 
values. Consider the United States Constitution, a document whose text 
nowhere expressly declares which values hold greater significance than 
others. Given the Constitution’s indeterminate text, how are we to identi-
fy the values that have precedence within it? Walter Murphy has devel-
oped one theory, among several possibilities, to rank-order the constitu-
tional values in the United States Constitution. He begins by acknowledg-
ing the difficulty of ranking its values:78 “At the root of the problem is that 
the American Constitution—like all such charters—tries to foster not one 
or two but a whole cluster of values.”79 But Murphy posits that in light of 
the evolution of the American polity since its founding, there is one value 
that is “most fundamental” among the Constitution’s substantive values: 
human dignity.80 With human dignity identified as the US Constitution’s 
                                                  
75   Cass Sunstein borrows from Lawrence Lessig in his discussion of preservative and 
transformative constitutions. See Cass R Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Consti-
tutions Do (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 67–68. 
76   See Richard A Primus, “When Should Original Meanings Matter?” (2008) 107:2 Mich L 
Rev 165 at 172–73. 
77   Ibid at 173–74. 
78   See Walter F Murphy, “The Art of Constitutional Interpretation: A Preliminary Show-
ing” in M Judd Harmon, ed, Essays on the Constitution of the United States (Port Wash-
ington: Kennikat Press, 1978) 130 at 147. 
79   Ibid. 
80   Ibid at 156. 
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core substantive value, we can then proceed to rank order the others by 
inquiring which are more or less consonant with serving human dignity.81 
 In addition to constitutional theory, constitutional interpretation can 
also help shape a hierarchy of values. Where the constitutional text does 
not entrench a formal hierarchy, courts may generate an informal one by 
way of constitutional interpretation, as constitutional interpretation inev-
itably compels judges to balance or reconcile competing claims. For exam-
ple, a court could interpret a constitutional provision as being immune 
from legal challenges alleging a violation of a protected right or liberty, 
thereby conferring upon that provision a special status, perhaps as a re-
sult of historical circumstance (this is what the Supreme Court of Canada 
has done with respect to section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867).82 Alter-
natively, a court could, through interpretation, create a hierarchy by ad-
judicating a dispute that requires the court to balance competing rights 
that collide.83 When two or more rights and interests intersect, courts 
must determine which prevails over the other given the particular facts of 
                                                  
81   See Walter F Murphy, “An Ordering of Constitutional Values” (1980) 53:2 S Cal L Rev 
703 at 754. 
82   See Adler v Ontario, [1996] 3 SCR 609 at 640–41, 140 DLR (4th) 385 [Adler]. Adler con-
cerned the modern application of a founding arrangement requiring Quebec to protect 
the rights of its Protestant religious minority and Ontario to protect those of its Roman 
Catholic religious minority. The arrangement, which was entrenched in section 93 of 
Canada’s Constitution Act, 1867 ((UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, 
No 5 [Constitution Act, 1867]), required Quebec to fund Protestant religious schools and 
Ontario to fund Roman Catholic religious schools. Three groups of plaintiffs challenged 
the constitutionality of section 93. They argued that it violated the constitutional free-
doms of conscience and religion as well as the right to equality—entrenched in the more 
recent Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
supra note 16)—insofar as it mandated the funding of religious schools for these reli-
gious minorities to the exclusion of mandatory funding for other religious faiths. In 
reaching its decision, the Supreme Court explained that “[s]ection 93 is the product of 
an historical compromise which was a crucial step along the road leading to Confedera-
tion” and that “[w]ithout this ‘solemn pact’, this ‘cardinal term’ of Union, there would 
have been no Confederation” (Adler, supra note 78 at 640). The Court interpreted sec-
tion 93 as effectively immune from constitutional challenges based on the freedoms of 
conscience and religion as well as on the right to equality: “[a]s a child born of historical 
exigency, s. 93 does not represent a guarantee of fundamental freedoms” (ibid). Adler 
therefore exempts section 93 from constitutional challenge. It would be inaccurate to 
describe section 93 as trumping all other constitutional provisions, however; it is more 
accurate to regard section 93 having a status equal to the rights entrenched in the 
Charter. 
83   All constitutional courts engage in this form of balancing—which is commonly referred 
to as a proportionality analysis—whether the items to be balanced are rights, liberties, 
constitutional arrangements or structures, national values, or otherwise. See e.g. David 
M Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) (ob-
serving and theorizing the ubiquity of proportionality analysis in constitutional courts). 
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the case. As courts resolve more cases like these, an informal constitu-
tional hierarchy emerges among those rights and interests. 
 For example, in the absence of a textually explicit hierarchy of values 
in the United States Constitution, US constitutional law has created an 
informal hierarchy of values through the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
interpretation. Over the course of American constitutional history, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has made judgments about which 
rights, rules, principles, and structures are worthy of greater protection 
than others. Whether the context has been balancing one right against 
another, assessing the constitutionality of state action, or simply inter-
preting the constitutional text, the Supreme Court has effectively rank-
ordered US constitutional provisions along a scale of relative importance. 
The Court’s informal constitutional hierarchy is flexible, subject to revi-
sion by subsequent interpretation, and not entrenched against amend-
ment; it is the product of dynamic interpretation, not of fixed constitu-
tional design at the time of the Constitution’s drafting. But it is neverthe-
less an authoritative declaration of values. In this way, the difficulty of 
using Article V to formally amend the US Constitution is mitigated by the 
Supreme Court’s ability to informally order and reorder the hierarchy of 
constitutional values. 
 The US Supreme Court’s informal hierarchy is reflected in its tripar-
tite sequence of scrutiny applied to evaluating the constitutionality of 
state action: rational basis, intermediate, and strict scrutiny. As Richard 
Fallon has observed, these scrutiny tests emerged as a result of “the Su-
preme Court’s solidifying commitment to a jurisprudential distinction be-
tween ordinary rights and liberties, which the government could regulate 
upon the showing of any rational justification, and more fundamental or 
‘preferred’ liberties entitled to more stringent judicial protection.”84 The 
Court has traditionally reserved strict scrutiny—the most stringent level 
of skepticism shown to a government decision—for state action that is al-
leged to compromise, among others, racial equality,85 political rights,86 and 
fundamental freedoms. 87  The second highest level of scrutiny—
                                                  
84   Richard H Fallon, Jr., “Strict Judicial Scrutiny” (2007) 54:5 UCLA L Rev 1267 at 1285. 
85   See e.g. Adarand Constructors v Pena, 515 US 200, 115 S Ct 2097 (1995) (holding that 
all racial classifications must be subject to strict scrutiny). 
86   See e.g. Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310, 130 S Ct 876(2010) 
(right to political speech); Tashjian v Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 US 208, 107 
S Ct 544 (1986) (right to association); Kramer v Union Free School District No 15, 395 
US 621, 89 S Ct 1886 (1969) (right to vote). 
87   See e.g. Saenz v Roe, 526 US 489, 119 S Ct 1518 (1999) (right to travel); Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye v Hialeah (City of), 508 US 520, 113 S Ct 2217 (1993) (freedom of 
religion). 
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intermediate scrutiny—has been applied to a category of rights and sta-
tuses that includes gender discrimination,88 illegitimacy,89 and commercial 
speech.90 The US Supreme Court applies the lowest level of scrutiny—
rational basis—to whatever does not fall within either strict or intermedi-
ate scrutiny.91 The Court’s scrutiny standards therefore express the rela-
tive standing of constitutional values by creating an informal hierarchy 
ordering rights and status along an ascending scale of importance.92 
 In addition to constitutional theory and constitutional law, constitu-
tional design offers another way to establish a hierarchy of values. In con-
trast to the informal hierarchy that develops through judicial interpreta-
tion, constitutional design can create a more formal hierarchy in three 
principal ways. First, constitutional designers may express values in the 
constitution’s preamble. As Levinson explains, preambles sometimes con-
vey a “commitment to some scheme of universal values.”93 Preambles of-
ten invoke such lofty ideals as justice,94 liberty,95 and democracy.96 Alt-
hough these values are often stated a high level of generality that could 
render them content-less, recent scholarship shows that rights and prin-
                                                  
88   See United States v Virginia, 518 US 515, 116 S Ct 2264 (1996); Craig v Boren, 429 US 
190, 97 S Ct 451 (1976). 
89   See Clark v Jeter, 486 US 456, 108 S Ct 1910 (1988); Lalli v Lalli, 439 US 259, 99 S Ct 
518 (1978). 
90   See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v Public Service Commission of New York, 447 
US 557, 100 S Ct 2343 (1980); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc, 425 US 748, 96 S Ct 1817 (1976). 
91   See e.g. New York City Transit Authority v Beazer, 440 US 568, 99 S Ct 1355 (1979); 
Railway Express Agency v New York, 336 US 106, 69 S Ct 463 (1949). But note that 
there are effectively two levels of rational basis review, one deferential and the other 
more rigorous. See Kenji Yoshino, “The New Equal Protection” (2011) 124:3 Harv L Rev 
747 at 759–60. 
92   See Calvin Massey, “The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?” (2004) 6:5 U 
Pa J Const L 945 at 992–94. 
93   Sanford Levinson, “Do Constitutions Have a Point?: Reflections on ‘Parchment Barriers’ 
and Preambles” (2011) 28:1 Social Philosophy & Policy 150 at 177. 
94   See e.g. Constitution of the Republic of Angola, 2008, preamble; Constitution of the Re-
public of Paraguay, 1992, No 63 of 1992, translated by Maria de Carmen Gress, pream-
ble; Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 1999, translated by Ministry 
of Communication and Information of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, preamble. 
95   See e.g. Constitution of the Republic of Cuba, 1976, translated by Anna I Vellvé Torras, 
preamble [Constitution of Cuba]; Constitution de la République française 1958, JO, 5 
October 1958 9151, preamble; Constitution of Morocco, 2011, translated by Jefri J 
Ruchti, preamble. 
96   See e.g. Constitution fédérale de la Confédération suisse, 1998, preamble; Constitution of 
the Republic of Uzbekistan, 1992, preamble; Constitution of the Republic of Zambia, 
1991, No 1 of 1991, as amended by Constitution of the Republic of Zambia Act, No 18 of 
1996, preamble [Constitution of Zambia]. 
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ciples listed in a constitution’s preamble are increasingly interpreted as 
justiciable.97 
 Second, designers may choose to express values elsewhere in the text 
of the constitution. For instance, the South African constitution opens, af-
ter its preamble, with a declaration that the state is founded on a series of 
values including human dignity, equality, non-racialism, non-sexism, the 
rule of law, and multi-party democratic government.98 Spain likewise ex-
pressly states values in the text of its constitution outside the preamble, 
entrenching the statement that “Spain is hereby established as a social 
and democratic State, subject to the rule of law, which advocates freedom, 
justice, equality and political pluralism as highest values of its legal sys-
tem.”99 Kazakhstan also follows this model, stating after the preamble of 
its constitution that “[t]he Republic of Kazakhstan proclaims itself a dem-
ocratic, secular, legal and social state whose supreme values are the indi-
vidual, his life, rights and freedoms.”100 
B. Constitutional Values and Constitutional Hierarchy 
 Constitutional designers may also entrench and therefore express con-
stitutional values in a third way: in their design of formal amendment 
rules. When constitutional designers entrench these rules, they may be 
electing more than a formal amendment procedure; they may be choosing 
deliberately to identify special political commitments. Formal amendment 
rules should consequently be seen as a third site where constitutional de-
signers may establish and express a formal hierarchy of values. I use the 
word may to stress that formal amendment rules are only sometimes in-
tended to express values. The point is therefore a modest one. It is not 
that all formal amendment rules always convey constitutional values; in-
stead, formal amendment rules are one of many sites within a constitu-
tional order for entrenching values and communicating them both inter-
nally (within the constitutional community) and externally (beyond its 
borders). While all constitutional provisions express some form of both 
substantive and procedural values, insofar as they are the product of ne-
gotiation and often partisan political contests about how to govern a con-
stitutional community, I am focusing on a relatively narrow dimension of 
                                                  
97   See Liav Orgad, “The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation” (2010) 8:4 Interna-
tional Journal of Constitutional Law 714 at 738. 
98   See Constitution of South Africa, supra note 16, s 1. 
99   Constitution of Spain, 1978, as amended to 1992, translated by Comparative Constitu-
tions Project, s 1. 
100  Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1995, as amended to No 403-IV of 2011, 
translated by the Constitutional Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, art 1(1). 
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constitutional design: the values expressed by the text of formal amend-
ment rules. 
 With this in mind, consider three provisions—A, B, and C—in a hypo-
thetical written federal constitution currently in draft, prior to its ratifica-
tion, at a constitutional convention today. Assume that the constitutional 
designers create three different thresholds for formal amendment and 
that they make A subject to formal amendment by the lowest of the three 
formal thresholds: simple majority agreement in both houses of the na-
tional legislature and simple majority approval from the sub-national leg-
islatures. The constitutional designers choose to require a higher thresh-
old to formally amend B: supermajority in both houses and supermajority 
approval from the sub-national legislatures. The designers then subject C 
to the highest amendment threshold: supermajority agreement in both 
houses of the national legislature, supermajority approval from the sub-
national legislatures, and a national referendum ratified by majority vote. 
 We can draw four interdependent conclusions about the constitutional 
designers’ choices with respect to A, B, and C in this hypothetical consti-
tutional design. First, we can conclude that the designers understand A, 
B, and C as qualitatively different from one another in some respect. Sec-
ond, we can deduce that the designers wish to find a mechanism by which 
to validate these perceived qualitative differences. Third, we can recog-
nize that the designers wish to convey their validation of these known dif-
ferences by entrenching them somewhere in the constitutional text. More 
specifically, fourth, we can conclude that the designers have identified the 
rules of formal amendment as one place within the constitution in which 
they can validate, by way of escalating entrenchment, these known differ-
ences among A, B, and C. 
 This deliberate choice to vary the level of difficulty for formally 
amending A, B, and C could reflect one of three conclusions. These conclu-
sions are not mutually exclusive and are closely related; yet it is im-
portant to distinguish them analytically, even though they may overlap. 
First, the choice to make one constitutional provision subject to a higher 
formal amendment threshold could represent a political bargain entered 
into by the constitutional designers for the sake of ratifying an otherwise 
“unratifiable” constitution. This possibility is illustrated by the equal suf-
frage clause in the United States Constitution,101 which requires a higher 
amendment threshold for changing a state’s voting power in the Senate 
than is required for amending anything else.102 The clause was a “consti-
                                                  
101  See US Const, supra note 7, art V. 
102  Another example of an absolutely necessary compromise provision in the US Constitu-
tion is the temporary entrenchment of the slave trade, as Ozan Varol explains in his 
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tutional essential” 103  to the adoption of the US Constitution; smaller 
states worried that without its protection, the larger, more populous 
states would overrun their interests.104 Madison explained that the clause 
“was probably meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the 
States, implied and secured by that principle of representation in one 
branch of the Legislature; and was probably insisted on by the States par-
ticularly attached to that equality.”105 Entrenching this heightened formal 
amendment protection was therefore a condition precedent to the Un-
ion.106 
 The different thresholds for formally amending A, B, and C could also 
reflect the concern that future generations of political actors will be 
tempted to act in their self-interest by seeking to amend certain power-
conferring constitutional provisions. The Honduran constitution illus-
trates such a concern. That constitution’s designers thought it necessary, 
given the nation’s history, to entrench presidential term limits against 
formal amendment;107 accordingly, the constitutional text designates the 
presidential term limit provision as unamendable.108 The durability and 
legitimacy of this rule were recently tested when then-President Manuel 
Zelaya proposed a national referendum on amending the term limit pro-
hibition.109 
      
study of temporary constitutions. See Ozan O Varol, “Temporary Constitutions” 102 Cal 
L Rev [forthcoming in 2014] at 40–42. 
103  Douglas G Smith, “An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles of Confedera-
tion and the Constitution” (1997) 34:1 San Diego L Rev 249 at 322. 
104  Roger Sherman argued that “each State ought to be able to protect itself: otherwise a 
few large States will rule the rest” (Farrand, ed, supra note 51 at 196). Sherman also 
suggested that “[t]he smaller States would never agree to the plan on any other princi-
ple (than an equality of suffrage in this branch[)]” (ibid at 201). 
105  James Madison, “The Federalist No. 43,” in Jacob E Cooke, ed, The Federalist (Mid-
dletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961) 288 at 296. 
106  After several debates on the matter, the equal suffrage clause was adopted without op-
position. See Farrand, ed, supra note 51 at 505–09. 
107  See Teresa Stanton Collett, “Judicial Independence and Accountability in an Age of Un-
constitutional Constitutional Amendments” (2010) 41:2 Loy U Chi LJ 327 at 345–46. 
108  See Constitution of the Republic of Honduras, 1982, No 131 of 1982, arts 239 (establish-
ing one-term rule), 374 (entrenching article 239 against formal amendment). 
109  For a discussion and analysis of this episode, see e.g. Frank M Walsh, “The Honduran 
Constitution is Not a Suicide Pact: The Legality of Honduran President Manuel Ze-
laya’s Removal” (2010) 38:2 Ga J Int’l & Comp L 339; Doug Cassel, “Honduras: Coup 
d’Etat in Constitutional Clothing?—Revision”, online: (2009) 13:9 ASIL Insights 
<www.asil.org/insights091015.cfm>; William Ratliff, “Understanding the Mess in Hon-
duras” Forbes (28 September 2009), online: Forbes <www.forbes.com/2009/09/28/ 
honduras-zelaya-insulza-opinions-contributors-william-ratliff.html>; Elisabeth Malkin, 
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 The choice to vary the level of amendment difficulty among A, B, and 
C could also reflect a third conclusion, which is the one that will occupy 
the remainder of this article. The different thresholds for formally amend-
ing A, B, and C could reflect a considered judgment about their relative 
importance. On this theory, to require a more demanding formal amend-
ment threshold for C than for B, and likewise for B than for A, is to de-
clare that C is the most important provision among the three, followed by 
B, and finally by A. What results from this constitutional design, then, is 
a formal constitutional hierarchy that identifies the principles, rules, 
rights, or structures that constitutional designers wish to privilege.110  
C. Constitutional Hierarchy in Formal Amendment Rules 
 Constitutional values may therefore be ordered in a constitutional hi-
erarchy in the design of formal constitutional amendment rules. In this 
section, I will demonstrate how constitutional hierarchies may emerge 
from four different designs of these rules: (1) an escalating structure of 
formal amendment rules, as exhibited by the Canadian, South African, 
Ghanaian, Nigerian, and Indian constitutions; (2) subject-matter re-
strictions, as demonstrated by the Cuban, Afghan, and Brazilian constitu-
tions; (3) an escalating structure of formal amendment rules alongside 
subject-matter restrictions, with reference to the Ukrainian constitution; 
and (4) a non-escalating structure of formal amendment rules alongside 
subject-matter restrictions, as seen in the Cameroonian and Portuguese 
constitutions. I note at the outset that we should not attribute the inten-
tion to express a relative ordering of constitutional importance to all con-
stitutional hierarchies. As I have stressed above, the entrenchment of a 
formal constitutional hierarchy can reflect one or more motivations, 
namely political bargaining, a defense against self-dealing, and the ex-
pression of values; it often reflects some combination of these three. 
 Consider first the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982. Its text creates 
five escalating tiers of entrenchment with different procedures to formally 
amend the constitution, each imposing higher and still higher thresholds 
      
“Honduran President Is Ousted In Coup” New York Times (29 June 2009), online: New 
York Times <www.nytimes.com>. 
110  I am grateful to Tom Ginsburg for the point that measuring amendment difficulty is 
challenging. For example, it is difficult to assess whether achieving a majority in a na-
tional referendum is harder than achieving a supermajority in a bicameral legislature. 
But when escalating amendment thresholds are cumulative rather than simply dissimi-
lar, one can posit that each increasing threshold will be harder to achieve than the pre-
vious threshold. 
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for altering certain constitutional provisions.111 The first is known as the 
general amendment procedure, under which a formal amendment re-
quires resolutions from both the House of Commons and the Senate as 
well as resolutions from at least two-thirds of the provinces representing 
at least half of the total provincial population.112 This procedure is the Ca-
nadian constitution’s default rule for formal amendment: unless otherwise 
specified, all formal amendments must be achieved using the general 
amendment procedure. The constitution also specifies that certain 
items—namely provincial representation in the Senate, senatorial powers 
and elections, and the creation of new provinces―are amendable only 
through the general amendment procedure.113 
 The second amendment procedure is more stringent than the general 
procedure, requiring unanimous agreement among both houses of Par-
liament and each provincial legislature.114 It applies to five expressly des-
ignated matters: (1) the monarchy and its representation in Canada; (2) 
provincial representation in the House of Commons; (3) the use of English 
and French, subject to the bilateral/multilateral procedure discussed be-
low; (4) the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada; and (5) the for-
mal amendment procedures themselves.115 The third bilateral/multilateral 
                                                  
111  See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 16, ss 38–49. Some scholars interpret Canada’s 
formal amendment rules as consisting of seven different procedures. See e.g. James 
Ross Hurley, Amending Canada’s Constitution: History, Processes, Problems and Pro-
spects (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1996) at 69; Tsvi Kahana, “Canada” in 
Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro, eds, How Constitutions Change: A Comparative Study 
(Portland: Hart Publishing, 2011) 9 at 25. But as Hurley concedes, “[o]pinions may 
vary, however, on the precise number of procedures” (Hurley, supra note 111 at 69). I 
agree with Peter Hogg’s interpretation that there are five formal amendment proce-
dures. See Peter W Hogg, “Formal Amendment of the Constitution of Canada” (1992) 
55:1 Law & Contemp Probs 253 at 257. 
112  See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 16, s 38(1). A province may opt out of a constitu-
tional amendment passed using the general procedure in certain circumstances. See 
ibid, s 38(3). 
113  Ibid, s 42(1):  
An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to the following 
matters may be made only in accordance with subsection 38(1): (a) the prin-
ciple of proportionate representation of the provinces in the House of Com-
mons prescribed by the Constitution of Canada; (b) the powers of the Senate 
and the method of selecting Senators; (c) the number of members by which a 
province is entitled to be represented in the Senate and the residence qualifi-
cations of Senators; (d) subject to paragraph 41(d), the Supreme Court of 
Canada; (e) the extension of existing provinces into the territories; and 
(f) notwithstanding any other law or practice, the establishment of new prov-
inces. 
114  Ibid, s 41. 
115  Ibid. 
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procedure, in contrast, is less exacting than the general formula. Under 
this procedure, resolutions from both houses of Parliament and from the 
legislature(s) of an affected province are necessary for amendments relat-
ing to the alteration of boundaries between provinces, the use of English 
or French within a province, or any other matter applying to some but not 
all provinces.116 
 The fourth and fifth procedures—the federal unilateral procedure and 
its provincial unilateral equivalent—are even less exacting than the bilat-
eral/multilateral procedure. The federal unilateral procedure authorizes 
the national Parliament to formally amend the Constitution by passing a 
law.117 This procedure applies only to matters relating to the executive 
government or the houses of Parliament, and excludes those matters con-
cerning executive government and the national legislature that are ex-
pressly keyed to higher amendment thresholds.118 The provincial unilat-
eral procedure authorizes provincial legislatures to formally amend their 
own constitutions by passing a law.119 This procedure applies to all pro-
vincial matters except those specifically assigned higher amendment 
thresholds.120  
 It is possible to conceptualize these amendment procedures along an 
ascending scale of difficulty. Each procedure adds an additional hurdle be-
fore political actors may consummate a formal amendment. (For the mo-
ment, let us set aside the provincial unilateral amendment procedure be-
cause it applies only to amendments of a provincial, not the national, con-
stitution, although we should understand a provincial constitution to in-
corporate parts of the written and unwritten constitution of Canada, and 
                                                  
116  Ibid, s 43:  
An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to any provision 
that applies to one or more, but not all, provinces, including (a) any altera-
tion to boundaries between provinces, and (b) any amendment to any provi-
sion that relates to the use of the English or the French language within a 
province, may be made by proclamation issued by the Governor General un-
der the Great Seal of Canada only where so authorized by resolutions of the 
Senate and House of Commons and of the legislative assembly of each prov-
ince to which the amendment applies. 
117  “Subject to sections 41 and 42, Parliament may exclusively make laws amending the 
Constitution of Canada in relation to the executive government of Canada or the Senate 
and House of Commons” (ibid, s 44). 
118  Ibid. In a current project related to the recent Senate Reference, I am developing the 
argument that Canada’s escalating design of formal amendment rules are more compli-
cating than clarifying. 
119  “Subject to section 41, the legislature of each province may exclusively make laws 
amending the constitution of the province” (ibid, s 45). 
120  Ibid. 
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likewise the written and unwritten constitution of Canada incorporates 
within it parts or all of each of the provincial constitutions.) The proce-
dures along each threshold are cumulative; each one incorporates the 
lower threshold in some manner. The lowest level of amendment—the 
federal unilateral procedure—requires simple majorities in each of the 
two houses of Parliament. 121  The next highest threshold—the bilat-
eral/multilateral procedure—demands both the requirements of the fed-
eral unilateral procedure and a resolution from the affected province(s).122 
The general formula is the third highest threshold; it requires both the 
agreement of the two houses of Parliament and the consent of seven of the 
ten provinces representing at least fifty per cent of the provincial popula-
tion.123 Finally, the unanimity requirement is the hardest one of all, re-
quiring both houses of Parliament and each of the ten provinces to 
agree.124 
 These escalating tiers of formal entrenchment may signal constitu-
tional designers’ intent to match the level of formal amendment difficulty 
to the significance of the role the designated provision occupies, either 
functionally in the constitutional regime or symbolically in the constitu-
tional text.125 For Stephen Scott, the multiple formal amendment proce-
dures should be seen as “standing in a hierarchy, so that the former 
stands to the latter as the ‘more difficult’ to the ‘less difficult’”—with Scott 
referring to the more comprehensive and less comprehensive procedures, 
respectively.126 Peter Hogg observes that the highest level of formal en-
trenchment in the Canadian constitution—the unanimity procedure—
applies to the most important matters, what he calls “specially en-
trenched” provisions that are have national significance: “The five listed 
topics are specially entrenched because they are deemed to be matters of 
national significance which should not be altered over the objection of 
even one province.”127 Walter Dellinger makes a similar observation, not-
ing that Canada’s formal amendment rules provide “special protection to 
                                                  
121  Ibid, s 44.  
122  Ibid, s 43. 
123  Ibid, s 38(1). Territorial population does not appear to count toward national popula-
tion. See ibid, s 38(2). 
124  Ibid, s 41. 
125  I am currently completing a paper in which I explore the origins and evolution of Cana-
da’s formal amendment rules. This paper will show that although the design of Cana-
da’s escalating amendment rules were intended to express values along a constitutional 
hierarchy, their design was also constrained by constitutional history in important 
ways that have yet to be explored. 
126  Stephen A Scott, “Pussycat, Pussycat or Patriation and New Constitutional Amend-
ment Processes” (1982) 20 UWO L Rev 247 at 304. 
127  Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at 4–25. 
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certain very fundamental matters,” distinguishing the highest amend-
ment threshold from the lower ones.128 Escalating amendment thresholds 
may therefore be deployed, as they have been in Canada, to make it hard-
er to amend special constitutional provisions, though they may also be the 
result of a political bargain or a defense against self-interest, as discussed 
above. 
 The South African constitution’s escalating tiers of formal amendment 
are similar to those in Canada’s Constitution Act, 1982. The South African 
constitution entrenches three amendment procedures which, like the for-
mal amendment thresholds in the Canadian constitution, may each be 
used to amend a limited universe of constitutional provisions. Take the 
most demanding formal amendment procedure. It requires approval by 
three-quarters of South Africa’s National Assembly and two-thirds of its 
National Council of Provinces, and it must be used for any formal 
amendment to the constitution’s declaration of values and to this amend-
ment formula.129 The mid-level formula calls for a lower threshold—two-
thirds approval in the National Assembly and two-thirds approval in the 
National Council of Provinces—and applies to any formal amendment to 
the Bill of Rights, the National Council of Provinces, and provincial mat-
ters.130 The least demanding formula requires only two-thirds approval in 
the National Assembly and is to be used for formal amendments to all 
other constitutional matters.131 What results from these escalating thresh-
olds of formal amendment is a constitutional hierarchy, with South Afri-
ca’s stated constitutional values and the formal amendment procedures at 
the top, the Bill of Rights and provincial matters in the middle, and all 
other constitutional provisions below. 
 A similar hierarchy is observable in other constitutions that entrench 
escalating thresholds of formal amendment. In the Ghanaian constitution, 
formally amending certain provisions, for example the constitution’s pro-
                                                  
128  Walter Dellinger, “The Amending Process in Canada and the United States: A Com-
parative Perspective” (1982) 45:4 Law & Contemp Probs 283 at 300. 
129  Constitution of South Africa, supra note 16, s 74(1). The constitution’s statement of con-
stitutional values proclaims that  
[t]he Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on 
the following values: (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms. (b) Non-racialism and non-
sexism. (c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. (d) Universal 
adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-
party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, respon-
siveness and openness (ibid, s 1). 
130  Ibid, s 74(2).  
131  Ibid, s 74(3). 
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tections for fundamental rights and freedoms,132  requires a very high 
threshold of agreement: there must be a proposal in Parliament and con-
sultation with the Council of State, followed by a referendum with at least 
forty per cent popular participation and three-quarters approval, ratifica-
tion by Parliament, and assent from the President.133 In contrast, another 
group of constitutional provisions, for instance the provision authorizing 
the President to appoint the Chief of Defense Staff of the Armed Forces,134 
may be amended by a moderately less onerous process requiring a pro-
posal in Parliament, consultation with the Council of State, two succes-
sive votes of two-thirds approval in Parliament, and the President’s as-
sent.135 The Ghanaian constitution thus has a two-tier hierarchy that sets 
fundamental rights and freedoms apart from other provisions. 
                                                  
132  Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992, arts 12–33 [Ghanaian Constitution]. 
133  Ibid, art 290. Fundamental rights and freedoms are considered “entrenched” in the 
Ghanaian Constitution. The following procedures govern the formal amendment of “en-
trenched” provisions: 
(2) A bill for the amendment of an entrenched provision shall, before Par-
liament proceeds to consider it, be referred by the Speaker to the Coun-
cil of State for its advice and the Council of State shall render advice on 
the bill after thirty days after receiving it. 
(3)  The bill shall be published in the Gazette but shall not be introduced in-
to Parliament until the expiry of six months after the publication in 
the Gazette under this clause. 
(4) After the bill has been read the first time in Parliament it shall not be 
proceeded with further unless it has been submitted to a referendum 
held throughout Ghana and at least forty percent of the persons entitled 
to vote, voted at the referendum and at least seventy-five percent of the 
persons who voted cast their votes in favour of the passing of the bill. 
(5) Where the bill is approved at the referendum, Parliament shall pass it. 
(6) Where a bill for the amendment of an entrenched provision has been 
passed by Parliament in accordance with this article, the President 
shall assent to it (ibid, arts 290(2)–(6)). 
134  Ibid, art 212(1). 
135  Ibid, art 291. The following procedures govern the formal amendment of “non-
entrenched” provisions: 
(1)  A bill to amend a provision of this Constitution which is not an en-
trenched provision shall not be introduced into Parliament unless— 
 (a) it has been published twice in the Gazette with the second publica-
tion being made at least three months after the first; and  
 (b) at least ten days have passed after the second publication. 
(2)  The Speaker shall, after the first reading of the bill in Parliament, refer 
it to the Council of State for consideration and advice and the Council of 
State shall render advice on the bill within thirty days after receiving it. 
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 Likewise, under the Nigerian constitution, there is a difference in 
thresholds for formally amending different provisions: the Nigerian con-
stitution has a similar two-tier hierarchy that results from its escalating 
model of formal amendment. At the higher threshold, a formal amend-
ment requires four-fifths approval in both houses of the national legisla-
ture as well as two-thirds approval from all sub-national legislatures. This 
threshold applies to provisions concerning fundamental rights, the crea-
tion of new sub-national units, adjustments to territorial boundaries, and 
the formal amendment rules themselves.136 Other constitutional provi-
sions may be formally amended with a lower threshold requiring two-
thirds approval in both houses of the national legislature and two-thirds 
approval among sub-national legislatures.137  
 The Indian constitution also entrenches two amendment thresholds. 
The higher threshold applies exclusively to specifically designated provi-
sions, while the lower threshold applies to all others. The lower threshold 
requires either house of the national legislature to propose an amend-
ment, each house to pass it by a supermajority, and the President to as-
sent to it.138 All constitutional provisions are subject to this rule of formal 
      
(3)  Where Parliament approves the bill, it may only be presented to the 
President for his assent if it was approved at the second and third read-
ings of it in Parliament by the votes of at least two thirds of all the 
members of Parliament. 
(4)  Where the bill has been passed in accordance with this article, the Pres-
ident shall assent to it (ibid). 
136  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, No 27 of 1999, s 9(3):  
An Act of the National Assembly for the purpose of altering the provisions of 
this section, section 8 or Chapter IV of this Constitution shall not be passed 
by either House of the National Assembly unless the proposal is approved by 
the votes of not less than four-fifths majority of all the members of each 
House, and also approved by resolution of the Houses of Assembly of not less 
than two-thirds of all the States. 
137  Ibid, s 9(2): 
An Act of the National Assembly for the alteration of this Constitution, not 
being an Act to which section 8 of this Constitution applies, shall not be 
passed in either House of the National Assembly unless the proposal is sup-
ported by the votes of not less than two-thirds majority of all the members of 
that House and approved by resolution of the Houses of Assembly of not less 
than two-thirds of all the States. 
138  See Constitution of the Sovereign Democratic Republic of India, 1950, art 368(2): 
An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the introduction 
of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is 
passed in each House by a majority of the total membership of that House 
and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House 
present and voting, it shall be presented to the President for his assent and 
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amendment unless they concern the formal amendment rules themselves, 
the presidential electoral college, Union courts, federalism, or the relative 
powers of the national and sub-national governments. Where an amend-
ment relates to these subjects, the Indian constitution requires an addi-
tional voting procedure prior to the President’s assent: at least half of the 
sub-national legislatures must ratify the amendment.139 Just as the Indi-
an constitution suggests through its entrenchment of formal amendment 
rules that certain provisions may be more highly valued or more political-
ly salient than others, so do the Canadian, South African, and Nigerian 
constitutions.  
 We can likewise discern a constitutional hierarchy in subject-matter 
restrictions on formal amendment rules. When a constitutional text dis-
tinguishes one provision from another by expressly designating one of 
them as impervious to the formal amendment rules that apply to the oth-
er, one possible message both conveyed and perceived is that one of the 
two provisions is more highly valued. The degree to which a constitutional 
provision is insulated from formal amendment and from the unpredicta-
bility of constitutional politics is in this case a proxy for preference. The 
stricter its entrenchment, the higher the constitutional worth of a given 
provision. Absolute entrenchment against formal amendment is thus the 
strongest statement of a provision’s value.140 
  To illustrate the point, consider a few examples of these subject-
matter restrictions. The Cuban constitution absolutely entrenches social-
ism against formal amendment. The text states that socialism “is irrevo-
      
upon such assent being given to the Bill, the Constitution shall stand 
amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill: 
Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change in— 
 (a) Article 54, Article 55, Article 73, Article 162 or Article 241, or 
 (b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of Part XI, or 
 (c)  any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or 
 (d) the representation of States in Parliament, or 
 (e)  the provisions of this Article, 
the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures of not less 
than one-half of the States specified in Parts A and B of the First Schedule by 
resolutions to that effect passed by those Legislatures before the Bill making 
provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent. 
139  Ibid. 
140  See Miriam Galston, “Theocracy in America: Should Core First Amendment Values be 
Permanent?” (2009) 37:1 Hastings Const LQ 65 at 115. 
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cable, and Cuba will never go back to capitalism.”141 For Afghanistan, the 
similarly situated value is Islam: the Afghan constitution declares that 
“[t]he principles of adherence to the tenets of the Holy religion of Islam as 
well as Islamic Republicanism shall not be amended.”142 And in Brazil, 
federalism occupies the privileged position that socialism and religion oc-
cupy in Cuba and Afghanistan, respectively, insofar as its constitutional 
text states that “[n]o proposed constitutional amendment shall be consid-
ered that is aimed at abolishing ... the federalist form of the National 
Government.”143  These content restrictions on the operation of formal 
amendment rules tell us just how much socialism, religion, and federal-
ism matter in Cuba, Afghanistan, and Brazil. Constitutional designers re-
garded these principles as so important as to disable the formal amend-
ment rules against them altogether. 
 A constitutional hierarchy can also emerge concurrently from the 
combination of formal amendment rules and subject-matter restrictions. 
Consider the Ukrainian constitution, a text that entrenches subject-
matter restrictions alongside escalating tiers of formal amendment. The 
Ukrainian constitution’s designers set apart three items from others—
human rights and freedoms, national independence, and territorial integ-
rity—by designating them as formally unamendable.144 Visually, we can 
place these unamendable provisions at the summit of the constitutional 
hierarchy. At the intermediate level of the hierarchy of importance, we 
can place the Ukrainian constitution’s statement of general principles, its 
rules for elections and referenda, and the formal amendment rules them-
selves, for which the constitution requires a proposal by either the Presi-
dent or two-thirds of the national legislature, adoption again by a two-
thirds vote in the national legislature, and ratification via national refer-
endum.145 Finally, the remaining constitutional provisions sit at the low-
                                                  
141  Constitution of the Republic of Cuba 1976, Codification of 2003, translated by Anna I 
Vellvé Torras & William S Hein & Co, Inc, s 3. 
142  Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2004, translated by Comparative 
Constitutions Project, art 149 [Constitution of Afghanistan]. 
143  Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, 1988, translated by Comparative Con-
stitutions Project, art 60(4)(1). 
144  See Constitution of Ukraine, 1996 (“[t]he Constitution of Ukraine shall not be amended, 
if the amendments foresee the abolition or restriction of human and citizens’ rights and 
freedoms, or if they are aimed toward the liquidation of the independence or violation of 
the territorial indivisibility of Ukraine,” art 157). 
145  Ibid, art 156: 
A draft law on introducing amendments to Chapter I—“General Principles,” 
Chapter III—“Elections. Referendum,” and Chapter XIII—“Introducing 
Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine,” is submitted to the Verkhovna 
Rada of Ukraine by the President of Ukraine, or by no less than two-thirds of 
the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and on the 
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est level of Ukraine’s constitutional hierarchy, for which formal amend-
ment is possible by the lower of the two amendment thresholds: proposal 
by either the President or one-third of the national legislature, adoption 
by a majority of the national legislature, followed by a subsequent two-
thirds vote in the national legislature.146  
 A hierarchy of values likewise emerges when a constitutional text 
combines a non-escalating structure of formal amendment alongside sub-
ject-matter restrictions. For example, the Portuguese constitution en-
trenches content restrictions alongside a single procedure for formal 
amendment. The result is a two-tier constitutional hierarchy pursuant to 
which most provisions are subject to the constitution’s single amendment 
formula, which requires two-thirds approval from the national legisla-
ture.147 The more valued provisions are designated as unamendable and 
are therefore immune from this procedure. Consider also the Came-
roonian constitution, which entrenches general formal amendment proce-
dures applicable to all of the constitutional provisions except four princi-
ples expressly designed as formally unamendable:148 republicanism, na-
      
condition that it is adopted by no less than two-thirds of the constitutional 
composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and is approved by an All-
Ukrainian referendum designated by the President of Ukraine. 
146 Ibid, art 155: 
  A draft law on introducing amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, with 
the exception of Chapter I—“General Principles,” Chapter III—“Elections. 
Referendum,” and Chapter XIII—“Introducing Amendments to the Constitu-
tion of Ukraine,” previously adopted by the majority of the constitutional 
composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is deemed to be adopted, if at 
the next regular session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, no less than two-
thirds of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 
have voted in favour thereof. 
147  Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, 1976 (“[c]hanges in the Constitution shall be 
approved by a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Assembly present,” art 
286(2)). 
148  See ibid, art 63: 
(1) Amendments to the Constitution may be proposed either by the Presi-
dent of the Republic or by Parliament. 
(2)  Any proposed amendment made by a member of Parliament shall be 
signed by at least one-third of the members of either House. 
(3)  Parliament shall meet in congress when called upon to examine a draft 
or proposed amendment. The amendment shall be adopted by an abso-
lute majority of the members of Parliament. The President of the Re-
public may request a second reading; in which case the amendment 
shall be adopted by a two-third majority of the members of Parliament. 
(4)  The President of the Republic may decide to submit any bill to amend 
the Constitution to a referendum; in which case the amendment shall be 
adopted by a simple majority of the votes cast. 
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tional unity, territorial integrity, and democracy.149 Cameroon’s hierarchy 
of constitutional values therefore consists of two tiers: the subject-matter 
restrictions are on top, and the freely formally amendable provisions are 
on the bottom. 
III. The Authenticity of Formal Entrenchment 
 The values that constitutional designers choose to entrench in formal 
amendment rules may reflect either actual or inauthentic political com-
mitments. Where constitutional designers entrench values in order to ob-
scure contrary or ignoble political commitments, the disjunction between 
the constitutional text and political reality becomes problematic, both for 
the study of constitutional design and more immediately for those to 
whom the constitution applies. But to the extent that entrenched values 
accurately represent the intent or aspiration of constitutional designers, 
perception and reality mutually reinforce each other in the constitutional 
text’s declaration of values. In this Part, I will illustrate how the purpose 
and perception of constitutions and formal amendment rules may diverge. 
I will also demonstrate how we can evaluate the authenticity of the con-
stitutional values entrenched in formal amendment rules. As will become 
evident, the task is not an easy one, as it requires inquiry into text, law, 
and culture. My subject will be the German Basic Law, though the Cana-
dian constitution could serve just as well.150 
A. Purpose and Perception 
 Where constitutional designers entrench values in the constitutional 
text, we may consider these values authentic if the designers intended 
them to guide successor political and judicial actors in legislative and ex-
ecutive action and in judicial interpretation. On the other hand, where de-
                                                  
149  Constitution of the United Republic of Cameroon, 1972 (“[n]o procedure for the amend-
ment of the Constitution affecting the republican form, unity and territorial integrity of 
the State and the democratic principles which govern the Republic shall be accepted,” 
art 64). 
150  In a current project, I am doing just that. I am deconstructing and evaluating the de-
sign of formal amendment rules in Canada. I will build on the work of Canadian schol-
ars who have suggested that Canada’s escalating formal amendment rules reflect spe-
cial political commitments. See Hurley, supra note 111; Jacques-Yvan Morin & José 
Woehrling, Les constitutions du Canada et du Québec: du régime français à nos jours, t 
1–2, 2d ed (Montreal: Éditions Thémis, 1994); Benoît Pelletier, La modification consti-
tutionnelle au Canada (Scarborough: Carswell, 1996); Benoît Pelletier, “Les modalités 
de la modification de la Constitution du Canada” (1999) 33 RJT 1; Peter Oliver, “Cana-
da, Quebec, and Constitutional Amendment” (1999) 49:4 UTLJ 519; José Woerhling, 
“Les aspects juridiques de la redéfinition du statut politique et constitutionnel du Qué-
bec” (1991–1992) 7:1 RQDI 12. 
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signers entrench values but neither have emotional vulnerability to them 
nor intend those values to influence successor actors,151 we may presume 
that those entrenched values are inauthentic. This presumption may be 
rebutted with evidence that successor political and judicial actors have 
subsequently adopted these entrenched values as binding or guiding their 
conduct. The authenticity of entrenched values, however, is neither im-
mediately nor entirely clear from a constitutional text. 
 That written constitutions sometimes exhibit a disjunction between 
purpose and perception is a common critique of the study of formal consti-
tutions.152 As David Law and Mila Versteeg have conceded in their own 
work on formal constitutions, “[s]ome may object that formal constitutions 
are not worth studying because what is on paper does not necessarily 
translate into practice.”153 We need not look further than the Kremlin’s 
1936 Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to see just 
                                                  
151  See Samuel Scheffler, Equality and Tradition: Questions of Value in Moral and Politi-
cal Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 29. 
152  See e.g. George C Guins, “Towards an Understanding of Soviet Law” (1955) 7:1 Soviet 
Studies 14 at 18–23 (explaining why one cannot understand Soviet law by reading the 
Soviet Constitution); AE Dick Howard, “The Essence of Constitutionalism” in Kenneth 
W Thompson & Rett R Ludwikowski, eds, Constitutionalism and Human Rights: Amer-
ica, Poland, and France (London: University Press of America, 1991) 3 (describing some 
constitutions as “worthless scraps of papers” at 4); “Counterinsurgency and Constitu-
tional Design”, Note, (2008) 121:6 Harv L Rev 1622:  
A façade constitution can declare aspirational principles and adopt power 
structures for government, but such provisions and principles are ineffective 
and potentially delegitimized because they are not followed in practice. Many 
African constitutions, for example, were not tailored to their social context 
and were either ignored or manipulated, thereby undermining constitution-
alism and the rule of law (ibid at 1632 [footnote omitted]). 
  See generally Linda Camp Keith, “Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human 
Rights (1977–1996): Are They More Than Mere ‘Window Dressing?’” (2002) 55:1 Politi-
cal Research Quarterly 111 (finding some, though not clearly conclusive, statistical evi-
dence that certain constitutional provisions sometimes matter to the behaviour of states 
with respect to human rights). The study of formal constitutions is nonetheless im-
portant. As Beau Breslin has argued, the constitutional text as a unique collection of 
words, aspirations, objectives, and fundamental law is worthy of scholarly attention 
(Beau Breslin, From Words to Worlds: Exploring Constitutional Functionality (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009) at 8–9). 
153  David S Law & Mila Versteeg, “The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutional-
ism” (2011) 99:5 Cal L Rev 1163 at 1169. Law and Versteeg rebut this criticism, conced-
ing that although “[s]ometimes, constitutions neither constrain nor even describe the 
actual operation of the state,” these are the very reasons we should study them: first, 
“[t]o recognize that some constitutions are shams merely begs a host of further ques-
tions, none of which can be tackled without a systematic understanding of what the 
world's constitutions actually say” and, second, “[i]t is one thing to observe that formal 
or ‘large-C’ constitutions can diverge from actual or ‘small-c’ constitutional practice; it is 
another thing to know when and in what ways they diverge” (ibid [footnote omitted]). 
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how widely political practice may diverge from the constitutional text.154 
For political theorist Benjamin Barber, the Soviet constitution was merely 
a smokescreen: although it appeared from its words to be “the world’s 
most effusively rights-oriented constitution” in an “unprecedented fortress 
of human liberty,” the truth was plainly the opposite.155  
 This disjunction between purpose and perception is what Jan-Erik 
Lane calls the gulf between the formal written constitution and the real 
political constitution.156 Lane acknowledges that no regime successfully 
fulfills the entirety of its written constitutional commitments, but that 
some do better than others: “No state lives one hundred per cent in ac-
cordance with its written documents.”157 It is the size of the gulf between 
the codified constitution and the political constitution that matters in as-
sessing how well or poorly a regime measures up to its formally en-
trenched commitments. An authoritarian state would likely exhibit much 
greater dissonance between its written and political constitutions than a 
democratic one, which is more likely to aspire to harmonize the two. As 
Lane writes:  
[I]n dictatorships and authoritarian states there is typically a tre-
mendous distance between the formal constitution and the real con-
stitution. Often such states enact a constitutional document which 
has no connection whatsoever to institutional practices in the coun-
try. It is only a camouflage constitution.158 
David Law explains that camouflage constitutions serve a number of ulte-
rior motives, including gaining credibility in the international community 
or securing foreign investment.159 
 The problem, posits William Andrews, is that over the course of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, written constitutionalism became 
                                                  
154  See Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1936. 
155  Benjamin R Barber, “Constitutional Rights—Democratic Instrument or Democratic 
Obstacle?” in Robert A Licht, ed, The Framers and Fundamental Rights (Washington, 
DC: AEI Press, 1992) 23 at 30. 
156  Lane, supra note 23 at 45. 
157  Ibid. 
158  Ibid. 
159  David S Law, “Constitutions” in Peter Cane & Herbert M Kritzer, eds, The Oxford 
Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) 376 
at 380. Qianfan Zhang has discussed the related reasons why China continues to main-
tain a camouflage constitution. See Qianfan Zhang, “A Constitution Without Constitu-
tionalism? The Paths of Constitutional Development in China” (2010) 8:4 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 950 at 952–56. 
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synonymous with democracy.160 “Documentary Constitutions,” he writes, 
“have come to be identified with constitutionalism.”161 Authoritarian re-
gimes have taken advantage of this positive identification, exploiting 
what Giovanni Sartori calls the “favorable emotive properties” of the word 
“constitution”.162 Sartori describes the phenomenon in greater detail:  
[T]he political exploitation and manipulation of language takes ad-
vantage of the fact that the emotive properties of a word survive—at 
times for a surprisingly long time—despite the fact that what the 
word denotes, i.e., the ‘thing,’ comes to be a completely different 
thing.163 
Equating constitutions with constitutionalism was and remains problem-
atic because authoritarian regimes take advantage of that association to 
hide behind a strategically drafted democracy-embracing constitutional 
text that appears consistent with constitutionalism but really is only a fa-
çade. As Andrews explains, “many regimes in the world today have Con-
stitutions without constitutionalism. Tyrants, whether individual or col-
lective, find that Constitutions are convenient screens behind which they 
can dissimulate their despotism.”164  
 Formal amendment rules in constitutional texts are equally suscepti-
ble to authoritarian commandeering. Insofar as formal amendment rules 
reflect the usually unstated value of sovereignty,165 the rules are a profit-
able and inexpensive site where authoritarian regimes may express inau-
thentic values while securing for themselves the goodwill that may come 
from their public, even if dishonest, association with democratic ideals. 
Examples abound of suspicious constitutional entrenchment. When we 
read the Russian Federation’s constitution, which entrenches an escalat-
ing scale of formal amendment that makes it comparatively more difficult 
                                                  
160  William G Andrews, Constitutions and Constitutionalism, 2d ed (New York: D Van 
Norstand Company, 1963) at 22. 
161  Ibid. 
162  Giovanni Sartori, “Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion” (1962) 56:4 Am Polit 
Sci Rev 853 at 855. 
163  Ibid. 
164  Andrews, supra note 160 at 22–23. For a useful, though perhaps controversial, illustra-
tion of how authoritarian states behave undemocratically despite purporting to respect 
democracy, see Kenneth Roth, “Depots Masquerading as Democrats” in World Report 
(2008), online: Human Rights Watch <www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2k8_ 
web.pdf>. 
165  See e.g. Claude Klein & András Sajó, “Constitution-Making: Process and Substance” in 
Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitu-
tional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 419 at 438; Michel Troper, “Sover-
eignty” in Rosenfeld & Sajó, ibid, 350 at 363–65. 
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to amend civil and political rights,166 we should therefore ask whether this 
special entrenchment actually expresses an authentic political commit-
ment to protect these rights. This question should also arise when we 
read the Zambian constitution, which does the same with respect to its 
own fundamental rights and freedoms.167 Similar questions may be asked 
of the formal amendment rules in Bangladesh,168 Belarus,169 Ethiopia,170 
or Singapore,171 among many others.172 The best answer is to always take 
a skeptical posture to any special or absolute entrenchment of constitu-
tional values, and to evaluate whether the formally entrenched value 
aligns in reality with constitutional practice. 
 One of the weaknesses of entrenching values in formal amendment 
rules therefore doubles as the biggest weakness of written constitutions: 
their democratic commitments on parchment sometimes conceal undemo-
cratic practices in reality.173 Walter Murphy cautions us against supposing 
that constitutions necessarily bind political actors, because “[t]o think 
that words can constrain power seems foolish.”174 Constitutional commit-
ments, after all, are but words on paper—and to borrow again from Law 
and Versteeg, “sometimes, constitutions lie.”175 Law and Versteeg have 
shown that constitutions often promise more than they deliver, not only 
for illegitimate reasons associated with authoritarian regimes that find 
shelter under the cover of constitutionalism, but also for legitimate budg-
etary limitations that, despite good intentions, make it difficult to honour 
                                                  
166  Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993, translated by Comparative Constitutions 
Project, arts 134–37. 
167  Constitution of Zambia, supra note 96, s 79. 
168  See Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 1972, s 142. 
169  See Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, 1994, ss 146–49. 
170  See Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, No 1 of 1995, arts 104–
05. 
171  See Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, 1963, No 1493 of 1963 (1999 Rev Ed), art 
5. 
172  See e.g. Political Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala, 1985, as amended by Legis-
lative Accord No 18-93 of 1993, translated by Luis Francisco Valle Velasco, arts 277–80; 
Iraqi Constitution, 2005, art 126; Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 
2008, arts 433–36; Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, No 42 of 2003, art 193; Con-
stitution of Sierra Leone, 1991, No 6 of 1991, art 108. 
173  For contemporary illustrations, see David Landau, “Abusive Constitutionalism” (2013) 
47 UC Davis L Rev [forthcoming]. 
174  Walter Murphy, “Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy” in Douglas Green-
berg et al, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary 
World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) 3 at 7. 
175  David S Law & Mila Versteeg, “Sham Constitutions” (2013) 101:4 Cal L Rev 863 at 865 
[Law & Versteeg, “Sham Constitutions”]. 
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constitutionally entrenched socio-economic rights.176 The former, however, 
are examples of “sham constitutions” because they knowingly and pur-
posely fail to live up to the commitments they have publicly undertak-
en.177 
 Some sham constitutions proclaim a commitment to human rights in 
their formal amendment rules, yet political actors do not conform their 
conduct to those commitments; such commitments therefore reflect an in-
authentic expression of values. Although in these states, subject-matter 
restrictions purport to prohibit formal amendments to the human rights 
protections inscribed in their constitutions, political practice belies the 
textual respect for human rights. For instance, Afghanistan, Algeria, the 
Central African Republic, and Chad all entrench subject-matter re-
strictions on formal amendment to fundamental rights and freedoms, 
purporting to express the state’s commitment to these rights.178 But these 
four constitutional regimes appear in Law and Versteeg’s “hall of shame”, 
a list of the twenty-five worst sham constitutions that “combine far-
                                                  
176  Ibid at 868. 
177  Ibid at 865. 
178  See Constitution of Afghanistan, supra note 142, art 149:  
The principles of adherence to the tenets of the Holy religion of Islam as well 
as Islamic Republicanism shall not be amended. Amending fundamental 
rights of the people shall be permitted only to improve them. Amending other 
Articles of this Constitution, with due respect to new experiences and re-
quirements of the time, as well as provisions of Articles 67 and 1 Hundred 46 
of this Constitution, shall become effective with the proposal of the President 
and approval of the majority of National Assembly members; 
  Constitution of Algeria, 1996, No 96-438, art 178:  
No constitutional revision may infringe on: 
1. the Republican character of the State. 
2. the democratic order based on plural parties. 
3. Islam, as the religion of the State. 
4. Arabic, as the national and official language. 
5. the fundamental freedoms, on the rights of man and the citizen. 
6. the integrity and unity of the national territory. 
  See also Constitution of the Central African Republic, 2004, translated by Jefri J Ruchti 
(“[e]xpressly excluded from revision are: the republican and secular form of the State; 
the number and duration of presidential mandates; the conditions for eligibility; the in-
compatibilities to the functions of Head of State; the fundamental rights of the citizen,” 
art 108); Constitution of the Republic of Chad, 1996, as amended to 2005, translated by 
Jefri J Ruchti (“[n]o procedure of revision may be engaged or pursued when it infringes: 
the integrity of the territory, the independence, or the national unity; the republican 
form of the State, the principle of the separation of powers and secularity; the freedoms 
and fundamental rights of citizens; the policy [of] pluralism,” art 223). 
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reaching promises with relative little respect for rights in practice.”179 
These constitutional regimes benefit from the goodwill of the uninformed, 
who read the regimes’ respective constitutional texts believing that the 
texts reflect reality. 
 Another more recent example of an inauthentic expression of constitu-
tional values is evident in the constitution of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.180 Drafted by members of the current president’s then-transitional 
government,181 the constitution’s formal amendment rules designate sev-
eral matters—including republicanism, universal suffrage, and repre-
sentative government—as formally unamendable, 182  and they prohibit 
formal amendments that have the effect of diminishing human rights and 
liberties.183 We can suspect, however, that the Congo’s governing political 
class is not truly committed to these values,184 given the state’s low rank-
ing as an authoritarian regime in the Economist’s Democracy Index.185 
That the governing class in the Democratic Republic of the Congo does not 
appear to conform its conduct to the values entrenched in the constitu-
tion’s formal amendment rules suggests that it exploits the entrenchment 
of these values largely for public relations purposes. 
 Truly democratic and sham constitutions fall on the extremes of the 
constitutional spectrum. Both are relatively easy to recognize, particularly 
when compared to the vast number of middle-range regimes whose com-
bination of constitutional text, institutional structures, political practices, 
                                                  
179  Law & Versteeg, “Sham Contsitutions”, supra note 175 at 899. 
180  Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2006, as consolidated to No 11/002 of 
2011, translated by Jefri J Ruchti [Constitution of DRC].  
181  “DR Congo Backs New Constitution” (12 January 2006), online: BBC News Service 
<news.bbc.co.uk>. 
182  See Constitution of DRC, supra note 180, art 220. 
183  Ibid. 
184  The current president warned at the time of the referendum held to ratify the new con-
stitution that rejecting it would have “catastrophic” consequences for peace in the coun-
try. See “A Ray of Hope in the Heart of Africa” (19 December 2005), online: The Econo-
mist <www.economist.com>. It appears that the constitution was ratified by an over-
whelming supermajority because of citizens’ wish to make peace, to rebuild, and to 
combat their own “war wariness” rather than their broad popular involvement in the 
process of constitution-making. See James Thuo Gathii, “Popular Authorship and Con-
stitution Making: Comparing and Contrasting the DRC and Kenya” (2008) 49:4 Wm & 
Mary L Rev 1109 at 1123–24. 
185  See The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2012: Democracy at a Stand-
still (2013) at 8, online: The Economist <www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler. 
ashx?fi=Democracy-Index-2012.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex12>. The 
Democratic Republic of the Congo ranks 159 out of the world’s 167 countries on such 
democratic measures as electoral process and pluralism, the functioning of govern-
ment, and civil liberties (ibid). 
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and civil society make it difficult to categorize their constitutions as clear-
ly democratic or clearly sham. For these regimes, the inquiry into the au-
thenticity of the values expressed in their formal amendment rules re-
quires an analysis of the constitutional text, an evaluation of its interpre-
tation by political actors, and an assessment of whether the entrenched 
constitutional values align with the political culture. This inquiry cannot 
yield a quick answer, but it is likely to produce the correct one.  
B. Designing Constitutional Values 
 Few would contend that a constitutional text can on its own transform 
a political culture indisposed to the rules the text enshrines and averse to 
the values it proclaims. Despite the problematic divergence between con-
stitutional entrenchment and political commitment, the expressive func-
tion of written constitutions—and of formal amendment rules more specif-
ically—may nevertheless hold promise for helping to align constitutional 
text with political practice. As James Madison suggested, although “[i]t 
may be thought that all paper barriers against the power of the communi-
ty are too weak to be worthy of attention,” the rules and values en-
trenched in a written constitution may “have a tendency to impress some 
degree of respect for them, to establish the public opinion in their favor, 
and rouse the attention of the whole community.”186 Perhaps the strength 
of this tendency may be measured only retrospectively, since the future 
success of a constitution cannot reliably be known at its drafting. The best 
hypothesis is that constitutions and the values entrenched within their 
formal amendment rules are only as strong as their commitment to cul-
turally specific and socially relevant values.187 
 The expressive function of constitutional amendment rules has im-
portant implications for constitutional interpretation. The task of inter-
preting entrenched values need not commit us to a particular technique of 
interpretation, be it originalism, living constitutionalism, or another 
method. As I have written elsewhere, formal amendment rules may be 
both preservative and transformational: they may seek “to preserve some-
thing thought to be distinctive about, or fundamentally constitutive of, the 
state and its people,”188 or they may “repudiate the past by setting the 
state on a new course.”189 We may therefore interpret an entrenched value 
from an originalist perspective consistent with preservative entrench-
                                                  
186  US, Annals of Cong, vol 1, at 455 (8 June 1979). 
187  HWO Okoth-Ogendo, “Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an Afri-
can Political Paradox” in Greenberg et al, supra note 171, 65 at 68. 
188  Richard Albert, “Constitutional Handcuffs” (2010) 42:3 Ariz St LJ 663 at 678. 
189  Ibid at 685. 
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ment, which “aims to freeze a distinctly historical conception of the 
state,”190 or we may alternatively rely on the theory of living constitution-
alism to construe the entrenched value as being consistent with trans-
formative entrenchment, which reflects “more of an aspiration than a con-
cretized reality” and a “forward-looking project” that is open to evolving 
social and political norms.191  
 The interpretation of constitutional values is therefore not necessarily 
time-bound: it may be a time-specific inquiry that compels the interpreter 
to take the perspective of the authoring generation, but it may also be free 
of temporal constraints. The inquiry may create what Gadamer describes 
as a hermeneutical circle, which entails an interpretation that is “neither 
subjective nor objective, but describes understanding as the interplay of 
the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter.”192 This 
interpretation “proceeds from the communality that binds us to the tradi-
tion,” tradition being “not simply a precondition into which we come, but 
we produce it ourselves, inasmuch as we understand, participate in the 
evolution of tradition and hence further determine it ourselves.”193 As I 
suggest below, the German Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the 
formal amendment rules in the Basic Law exhibits elements of both his-
toricism and hermeneutics, of originalism and living constitutionalism. It 
is thus a feature, not a limitation, of my account of the expressive function 
of formal amendment rules that there are continuities between the con-
testability of constitutional interpretation in general and of the values en-
trenched in formal amendment rules more specifically.  
 The modern constitutional experience in Germany shows how political 
culture aligns with the values entrenched in formal amendment rules. 
The Basic Law’s formal amendment rules entrench and express the con-
stitutional value of human dignity: the text states in the first section of 
Article 1 that “the dignity of man shall be inviolable,” and adds that “[t]o 
respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”194 The rest 
of the article stresses the importance of human dignity: “The German 
people therefore acknowledges inviolable and inalienable human rights as 
the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world,”195 and 
“[t]he following basic rights shall be binding as directly valid law on legis-
                                                  
190  Ibid at 678. 
191  Ibid at 685. 
192  Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, ed and translated by Garrett Barden & John 
Cumming (New York: Crossroad, 1988) at 261. 
193  Ibid. 
194  Basic Law, supra note 14, art 1(1). 
195  Ibid, art 1(2). 
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lation, administration and judiciary.”196 Article 1 is entrenched as a sub-
ject-matter restriction on formal amendment, meaning that it is expressly 
shielded from the Basic Law’s formal amendment procedures: “An 
amendment to this Basic Law by which the organization of the Federation 
into Laender, the basic co-operation of the Laender in legislation or the 
basic principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 are affected, shall be inad-
missible.”197 
 In contrast to the inauthentic political commitments entrenched and 
expressed only for show in sham constitutions, the Basic Law’s commit-
ment to human dignity is authentic. This authenticity derives from two 
principal sources: the Basic Law’s design and its interpretation. First, as I 
discuss below, the Basic Law’s drafters intended to make human dignity 
its primary constitutional value. The entrenchment of human dignity as a 
subject-matter restriction was meant to be an actual constraint on gov-
ernmental conduct and was designed to convey its importance both inter-
nally to the persons bound by the Basic Law and externally to the wider 
world. Second, as I also describe below, the Federal Constitutional Court 
has interpreted Article 1’s human dignity provision as reflecting the Basic 
Law’s most important constitutional value. 
 The Basic Law can be understood only in its historical context. As 
Christian Walter has observed, “[e]ach constitutional document reflects 
the preoccupations of the time of its adoption.”198 The Basic Law is no dif-
ferent. Under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer, the Parliamentary 
Council made it a point to pass the Basic Law on May 8, 1949, both to 
mark the collapse of the Third Reich four years earlier on May 8, 1945, 
and to signal the beginning of a new constitutional regime.199 Adenauer’s 
statement at the signing and proclamation of the Basic Law echoes this 
theme of a new beginning: “Today a new chapter is being opened in the 
ever-changing history of the German people. ... Those who have witnessed 
the years since 1933 and the total breakdown in 1945 ... are with some 
emotion conscious of the fact that today ... a new Germany is being creat-
ed.”200 The Basic Law showed how different Germany might become. 
                                                  
196  Ibid, art 1(3). 
197  Ibid, art 79(3). 
198  Christian Walter, “Human Dignity in German Constitutional Law” in European Com-
mission for Democracy Through Law, The Principle of Respect for Human Dignity 
(1998), online: <www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-STD(1998)026-e.aspx>. 
199  Ernst Benda, “The Protection of Human Dignity (Article 1 of the Basic Law)” (2000) 
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 Rights protections formed the core of the new constitutional regime. 
The Basic Law, writes Werner Heun, “was intended to avoid a repetition 
of these experiences especially by emphasizing fundamental rights and 
assigning extended powers to a Constitutional Court.”201 The Parliamen-
tary Council inserted the unamendable provisions into the Basic Law to 
help guard against the failures of the Weimar constitution, which had 
failed to curb abuses of power and constrain government conduct.202 As 
Gregory Fox and Georg Nolte have written, the Basic Law’s framers  
reasoned that if such a clause had been present in the Weimar con-
stitution, Hitler would have been forced to violate the constitution 
openly before assuming virtually dictatorial power. They concluded 
that given the traditional orderly and legalistic sentiment of the 
German people, this might have made a difference.203 
The Basic Law thus became the first German constitution to entrench 
rights for citizens and also to require the state to defend those rights 
against violation.204 It is founded on rights and rooted “in the experience 
and in the memory of the holocaust, the war, and the liberation from un-
precedented dictatorship, ending inhumanity and tyranny by the notion of 
freedom and self-determination.”205 The Parliamentary Council was clear: 
fundamental rights would be central, not peripheral, to the Basic Law, 
and human dignity would permeate all fundamental rights.206 
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 The origin of the Basic Law’s absolute entrenchment of human dignity 
therefore lies in the intent to break from Germany’s recent past.207 The 
framers of the Basic Law entrenched human dignity as unalterable and 
thereby identified it as the most fundamental constitutional rights protec-
tion in response to Germany’s prior regime, under which human dignity 
“had been utterly trampled by the Nazis.”208 The Nazi regime had empha-
sized the primacy of the state, subordinated the individual, and attributed 
no intrinsic worth to the individual outside of her interaction with the 
state or other individuals. “The state did not exist for the citizens’ sake,”209 
according to Craig Smith and Thomas Fetzer; “to the contrary, the citi-
zens existed for the sake of the state. This exaltation of the people collec-
tively, in the form of the state, combined with the denial of individual 
worth to justify Nazi tyranny ideologically.”210 But the Basic Law’s en-
trenchment of human dignity “signaled an unequivocal break with Nazi 
ideology by strongly countering the core Nazi presumption of the individ-
ual’s lack of independent worth.”211 Making human dignity unamendable 
conveyed the message that the individual is “unequivocally superior to the 
state; the Federal Republic exists for the sake of its citizens rather than 
vice versa.”212 Absolute entrenchment expressed a special commitment to 
respecting individual worth.213 
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 The absolute entrenchment of human dignity has consequently creat-
ed absolute boundaries to circumscribe state power. Human dignity today 
stands at the top of Germany’s constitutional hierarchy. As Donald Kom-
mers explains, human dignity is “the highest value of the Basic Law, the 
ultimate basis of the constitutional order, and the foundation of guaran-
teed rights.”214 It is, in the words of Edward Eberle, the “architectonic 
principle of the German legal system.”215 In the leading English study of 
the Basic Law, Kommers and Russell Miller write that the Basic Law 
“has placed human dignity at the core of its value system,”216 and note 
that the Basic Law’s human dignity clause “expresses the highest value of 
the Basic Law, informing the substance and spirit of the entire docu-
ment.”217 The Basic Law has expressed the state’s commitment to human 
dignity as its most important value both through the symbolism of its en-
trenchment and likewise by the effect of its entrenchment,218 which is en-
forced by courts endowed by the Basic Law with the power to review gov-
ernmental conduct.219 
C. Interpreting Constitutional Values 
 The consequence of entrenching human dignity absolutely against 
amendment was predictable: entrenchment granted the judiciary the 
power to interpret the meaning of this value. As Melissa Schwartzberg 
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has argued, “when constitutional provisions are made unamendable and 
constitutional courts have final authority over the interpretation of such 
provisions, entrenchment does not actually inhibit alterations,”220 but ra-
ther “shifts the locus of change—and the power to determine the legiti-
mate scope of mutability—away from legislatures and toward the 
court.”221 The German Constitutional Court has used this power to inter-
pret the human dignity provision as the Basic Law’s supreme value,222 
calling it “the highest constitutional principle” in the Basic Law.223 Insofar 
as this interpretation conforms to the constitutional design of the Basic 
Law, it is unproblematic for the Court to make such pronouncements. 
Nonetheless, scholars and even judges themselves acknowledge the vast 
discretionary power that the absolute entrenchment of an open-textured 
provision like human dignity has conferred upon the Constitutional 
Court.224 
 Theoretically, its absolute entrenchment exempts human dignity from 
the balancing to which other rights are subject when they clash with com-
peting rights. But in practice, the Constitutional Court has interpreted 
human dignity as permitting government action that justifiably violates 
this value and as prohibiting governmental action that unjustifiably vio-
lates it.225 The distinction therefore turns on the extent to which the Court 
is persuaded to accept the justification. The Constitutional Court has gen-
erally read the human dignity protection alongside the Basic Law’s pro-
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tections for liberty and equality, enshrined in Articles 2226 and 3,227 respec-
tively.228 As Kommers and Miller write, “the relationships among Articles 
1, 2, and 3 are symbiotic.”229 They continue: 
Their provisions nourish and reinforce once another [and] the hu-
man dignity, liberty, and equality clauses inform the meaning of 
other constitutional values just as these other values infuse the 
meaning and limit the reach of the rights guaranteed by these three 
fundamental articles.230  
Several Constitutional Court cases exhibit the significance of human dig-
nity in German constitutional law. 
 In the early Microcensus Case, the Constitutional Court was asked to 
rule whether the compulsory disclosure of private vacations and recrea-
tional trips in a federal census violated the Basic Law’s human dignity 
protection.231 The Court concluded that they did not.232 Balancing the pri-
vacy of the individual under Article 2 with the state’s responsibility to 
govern responsibly, the Court recognized that the pressure of general pub-
lic compliance could conceivably inhibit an individual’s private personal 
sphere.233 But the balance here favoured the state’s census inquiries, both 
because the inquiries preserved the respondents’ anonymity and did not 
compel persons to disclose intimate personal details, and because individ-
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uals have a social responsibility to respond to such inquiries, which are 
necessary for government planning and operations.234 
 In the course of upholding the government’s census inquiries, the 
Court discussed the human dignity provision. The Court asserted that 
“[h]uman dignity is at the very top of the value order of the Basic Law.”235 
Human dignity means that “every human being is entitled to social 
recognition and respect in the community”;236 the state must treat persons 
as something more than “mere objects”.237 An individual cannot be re-
quired “to record and register all aspects of his or her personality, even 
though such an effort is carried out anonymously in the form of a statisti-
cal survey; [the state] may not treat a person as an object subject to an in-
ventory of any kind.”238 Within an individual’s private personal sphere, 
she is “her own master.”239 
 The Lifetime Imprisonment Case is another prominent human dignity 
case in which a drug dealer killed an addict who had threatened to expose 
the dealer’s criminal acts.240 The trial court ruled that the German Penal 
Code, which set out a mandatory penalty of life imprisonment for killing 
another to conceal criminal activity, ran counter to Article 1’s human dig-
nity protection.241 This court held that punishing a person with a life sen-
tence with no possibility of returning to society would amount to treating 
that person as mere object, and would therefore violate the state’s respon-
sibility to respect every person’s human dignity—a responsibility that ex-
tends even to a criminal.242 The Constitutional Court was then asked to 
review the trial court’s judgment. 
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 The Court ruled that life imprisonment violates human dignity where 
the evidence suggests that a prisoner can be rehabilitated.243 The Court 
began with Article 2(2) of the Basic Law, which authorizes Parliament to 
limit an individual’s right to personal freedom.244 The Court wrote, how-
ever, that this parliamentary power is itself limited, most notably by the 
inviolability of human dignity, which the Court again called “the highest 
value of the constitutional order.”245 The Court stressed that “[t]his means 
that the state must regard every individual within society with equal 
worth”246 and reiterated that “[i]t is contrary to human dignity to make 
persons the mere tools of the state.”247 The Court connected the risk of 
treating a person as an object with the punishment of lifetime imprison-
ment: “[T]he state cannot turn the offender into an object of crime preven-
tion to the detriment of his or her constitutionally protected right to social 
worth and respect” because “it would be intolerable for the state forcefully 
to deprive [persons of their] freedom without at least providing them with 
the chance to someday regain their freedom.”248 
 The meaning of the Basic Law’s human dignity provision becomes 
clearer with this case. The state is not forbidden from sentencing a con-
victed criminal to life imprisonment, but if the state imposes this penalty, 
it assumes the responsibility to work toward rehabilitating the prisoner 
and helping him re-enter society:  
Regarding those prisoners under life sentences, prisons also have 
the duty to strive toward their resocialization, to preserve their abil-
ity to cope with life and to counteract the negative effects of incar-
ceration and the destructive changes in personality that accompany 
imprisonment.249  
This responsibility flows from the Basic Law’s human dignity protection: 
“This task finds its justification in the constitution itself; it can be inferred 
from the guarantee of the inviolability of human dignity within the mean-
ing of Article 1(1) of the Basic Law.”250 The Court understood this duty to 
rehabilitate as interconnected with Article 1 insofar as “rehabilitation is 
constitutionally required in any community that establishes human digni-
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ty as its centerpiece and commits itself to the principle of social justice.”251 
What appears to underpin the inviolability of human dignity is the rejec-
tion of persons as objects. 
 Perhaps the most useful case to demonstrate the Basic Law’s hierar-
chy of constitutional values is the 1975 Abortion I Case.252 The subject of 
the case was section 218a of the Abortion Reform Act of 1974, which re-
moved criminal prohibitions on abortion provided that the procedure was 
performed by a licensed physician on a consenting woman during the first 
twelve weeks of pregnancy.253 Criminal penalties continued to apply for 
other abortions procured after the third month of pregnancy, with the ex-
ception of those pregnancies resulting from rape or incest or those termi-
nated on medical advice.254 The new law also required a woman to consult 
with a physician or a counseling agency about assistance available to 
pregnant women, mothers, and children.255 Several members of the Ger-
man Bundestag (the national lower house) as well as a number of German 
states petitioned the Constitutional Court to review whether the new law 
violated Article 1’s human dignity provision and Article 2’s right to life 
provision, among other constitutional rights.256 This compelled the Court 
to weigh the competing rights of the mother and the fetus, whose develop-
ing life the Court noted is protected by Article 2(2) of the Basic Law.257 
 Relying on the Basic Law’s ordering of values to reach is decision, the 
Constitutional Court found the new abortion law incompatible with the 
fetus’s human dignity and right to life.258 It stated, before reaching the 
merits of the case, that its deliberation “demands a total view of the con-
stitutional norms and the hierarchy of values contained therein.”259 Rec-
ognizing the importance of the case, the Court added that “[t]he gravity 
and seriousness of the constitutional questions posed become clear if it is 
considered that what is involved here is the protection of human life, one 
of the central values of every legal order.”260 The Court stressed that its 
task was not to judge the new abortion law against the values established 
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under another country’s constitution but rather against the values en-
trenched in the German Basic Law.261 The Court ultimately held that the 
law “is void insofar as it exempts termination of pregnancy from punish-
ment in cases where no reasons exist which—within the meaning of the 
[present] decisional grounds—have priority over the value order contained 
in the Basic Law.”262  
 Constitutional history played a significant part in the Court’s judg-
ment. The Court explained that the Basic Law’s entrenchment of the 
right to life was the result of the destruction of life that Germany had 
seen in its past:  
[T]he categorical inclusion of the inherently self-evident right to life 
in the Basic Law may be explained principally as a reaction to the 
‘destruction of life unworthy to live,’ the ‘final solution,’ and the ‘liq-
uidations’ that the National Socialist regime carried out as govern-
mental measures.263  
Under the Basic Law, the right to life affirms 
the fundamental value of human life and of a state concept that is 
emphatically opposed to the views of a political regime for which the 
individual life had little significance and that therefore practiced un-
limited abuse in the name of the arrogated right over life and death 
of the citizen.264 
The Court therefore contrasted the Weimar constitution and the regime 
that followed it with the Basic Law and the new regime that it sought to 
create. 
 Noting that the Basic Law is clear in its language that everyone shall 
have the right to life—with no “delimitation of the various developmental 
stages of human life”265—the Court affirmed that the right extends to the 
unborn, or what the Court called developing life.266 The Court then tied 
the right to life to human dignity, explaining that the obligation to protect 
the right to life follows from Article 1: “Wherever human life exists, it 
merits human dignity; whether the subject of this dignity is conscious of it 
and knows how to safeguard it is not important. The potential capabilities 
inherent in human existence from its inception are adequate to merit 
human dignity.”267 Yet the Court also acknowledged that the state has an 
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obligation to protect the life of the mother and that the mother’s pregnan-
cy exists within her private personal sphere: “The obligation of the state 
to take the developing life under its protection also exists in principle with 
regard to the mother. ... Pregnancy belongs to the intimate sphere of the 
woman that is constitutionally protected by Article 2 (1) in conjunction 
with Article 1 (1) of the Basic Law.”268 It is at this point that the Court in-
voked the hierarchy of constitutional values to resolve the collision be-
tween the rights of the developing life and the rights of the mother. 
 The Constitutional Court saw the conflict of rights as inhospitable to 
any compromise: “No compromise is possible that would both guarantee 
the protection of the unborn life and concede to the pregnant woman the 
freedom of terminating the pregnancy because termination of pregnancy 
always means destruction of the prenatal life.”269 In choosing which of 
these two rights to privilege, the Court felt itself bound to use the human 
dignity provision as its guide: “In the ensuing balancing process, ‘both 
constitutional values must be perceived in their relation to human dignity 
as the center of the constitution’s value system.’”270 As a result, the Court 
elevated the right of the fetus over the right of the mother. In the Court’s 
view, whereas prohibiting abortion only impairs a woman’s right to self-
determination, abortion destroys life: “When using Article 1 (1) as a 
guidepost, the decision must come down in favor of the preeminence of 
protecting the fetus’s life over the right of self-determination of the preg-
nant woman.”271 Although the Court conceded that “[p]regnancy, birth, 
and child-rearing may impair the woman’s right of self-determination and 
the right to many personal developmental potentialities,”272 it held as de-
terminative that “[t]he termination of pregnancy, however, destroys pre-
natal life.”273 The difference between the impairment of human dignity 
and its destruction was therefore great enough to tilt the Court toward 
protecting the right of the fetus. 
 As a final illustration of how the Constitutional Court has interpreted 
the Basic Law’s inviolable human dignity provision, consider the more re-
cent Aviation Security Act Case.274 The case arose out of the Aviation Se-
curity Act, which Germany adopted in the aftermath of the terrorist at-
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tacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States.275 The law authorized 
the German Minister of Defence, with the consent of the Minister of the 
Interior, to order the armed forces to shoot down a commercial aircraft 
thought to be hijacked in order to be used as a weapon against civilian 
targets.276 The Constitutional Court found the law unconstitutional on 
several grounds, notably because it would “deprive passengers and crew of 
their right to self-determination and thus make them ‘mere objects of the 
state’s rescue operation for the protection of others.’”277  
 The Constitutional Court’s refusal to authorize the state to treat a 
plane’s passengers as objects recalled its earlier decisions in the Microsen-
sus Case and the Life Imprisonment Case. As Kommers and Miller ex-
plain, the Court stated that “killing may not be employed as a means to 
save others, for human lives may not be disposed of ‘unilaterally by the 
state’ in this way, even on the basis of a statutory authorization.”278 The 
Court ultimately held that “an aircraft may not be shot down—and there 
is no constitutional state duty to shoot it down—simply because it may be 
used as a weapon to extinguish life on the ground, particularly since the 
ensuing loss of life would not bring an end to the body politic or the consti-
tutional system.”279 The Court again referred to the pre-eminence of hu-
man dignity as a constitutional value: “Human life is intrinsically con-
nected to human dignity as a paramount principle of the constitution and 
the highest constitutional value.”280 
 These four leading cases on Germany’s inviolable human dignity pro-
vision illustrate the authenticity of the political commitments entrenched 
in the Basic Law’s formal amendment rules, insofar as the entrenched 
value aligns with its interpretation and enforcement by political actors. 
Yet the constitutional design of the Basic Law and its interpretation by 
the Constitutional Court cannot, on their own, fully explain the alignment 
between German political culture and the entrenched constitutional value 
of human dignity. The Basic Law’s design and its interpretation have cer-
tainly contributed to the process of “sowing and growing” the constitu-
tional value of human dignity;281 yet the legislature’s deference to the 
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Court has also helped, particularly where the Court has invalidated legis-
lation on the basis of the human dignity provision and the legislature has 
responded by re-passing the law into conformity with the Court’s recom-
mendations.282 Germans themselves have also accepted as worthy and le-
gitimate the absolute entrenchment of human dignity, as I discuss below. 
 The German Basic Law recently marked its sixtieth anniversary. On 
that occasion, German constitutional theorist Matthias Mahlmann offered 
his reflections, calling the Basic Law “a resilient constitution” and “a re-
markable success” and noting proudly that “[s]ome aspects of the Basic 
Law have even become a kind of attractive export article not accounted 
for in Germany’s foreign trade balance, but nevertheless of considerable 
importance.”283 Mahlmann’s analysis underscored the importance of the 
Basic Law’s human dignity protection, which, in his view, has come to de-
fine the Basic Law in the public perception: 
The norm, however, that most characterizes the Basic Law in the 
public perception and in scholarly reflection is the guarantee of hu-
man dignity. This particular role is, to a large degree, a consequence 
of the German past. Nazism still legitimizes the guarantee of human 
dignity today by the abominable, vivid barbarism of its negation. 
The guarantee of human dignity formulates, however, not only the 
desire to refrain from fathoming yet another time a moral abyss, but 
a promise as well: the perspective to create a legal order that embod-
ies principles of human dignity not only through the absence of mis-
deeds, but also through legally institutionalized structures of a re-
publican culture of respect.284 
 The concept of human dignity has risen in public esteem as it has been 
applied across more spheres of German life. George Fletcher states the 
point: “When the German Basic Law of 1949 declares human dignity to be 
the foundational value of the constitution, the implications run through 
all relationships that may come into being.”285 Not only does human digni-
ty prescribe or proscribe state action, it also influences private action. The 
Constitutional Court has emphasized this point when explaining that the 
Basic Law entrenches an “objective order of values.”286 For the Court, the 
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Basic Law “is not a value-neutral document.”287 It is a value-laden text 
whose purpose is to protect rights in all spheres: “This value system, 
which centers upon dignity of the human personality developing freely 
within the social community, must be looked upon as a fundamental con-
stitutional decision affecting all spheres of law, both public and private.”288 
The Basic Law’s constitutional hierarchy thus creates a value system ex-
tending beyond the public sphere: “Every provision of private law must be 
compatible with this system of values, and every such provision must be 
interpreted in its spirit,” declared the Court in the pivotal 1958 Luth 
Case.289 
 The application of the Basic Law’s constitutional provisions to the pri-
vate sphere has been called the third party effect doctrine.290 Under this 
doctrine, the Constitutional Court interprets and applies the values of the 
Basic Law in such a way that vindicates those values, whether the matter 
is constitutional or civil.291 Frank Michelman calls this the “double aspect” 
of the Basic Law’s rights protections:  
As specifically worded guarantees (‘subjective rights’), they obligate 
only the state and its officials. These clauses also, however, speak—
as a ‘fundamental constitutional decision’ of the German people—for 
a set of underlying values and principles, an ‘objective value system’ 
for the whole of German civic life.292 
Michelman adds that “the Basic Law’s value-orderings must, accordingly, 
‘influence the civil law’ throughout, obligating ordinary judges to construe 
and apply the background-law provisions of the Civil Code always ‘in its 
spirit’ and never ‘in contradiction with’ it.”293 This language tracks the 
Court’s own; the Court has stated that “[t]his system infuses specific con-
stitutional content into private law, which from that point on determines 
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its interpretation.”294 It is important to note, however, that this doctrine 
does not contemplate the application of the Basic Law’s rights protections 
directly to private individuals, but only indirectly, through the Basic 
Law’s application to private law.295 
 The constitutional value of human dignity therefore derives its force 
from its entrenchment in the Basic Law, its interpretation by the Consti-
tutional Court, and its centrality to German political culture. The late 
German political theorist observed that modern Germany has become, 
“not only by the rules of its constitution but also in the reality of its consti-
tutional life ...[,] a state which has taken seriously its obligations to create 
favorable external conditions for its citizens to achieve a life in conformity 
with human dignity.”296 That Germany’s highest constitutional value is 
ordered objectively means that it is legally binding upon the entire consti-
tutional community.297 As Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez writes, “[t]his ob-
jective nature is crucial to securing the success of the principle of human 
dignity. In fact, such objectivity reinforces considerably its actual norma-
tive strength.”298 This transformation of the Basic Law’s normative aspi-
rations from subjective to objective values is critical to understanding how 
the values entrenched in the Basic Law’s formal amendment rules have 
become and have since remained authentic political commitments.  
Conclusion 
 Formal amendment rules do more than serve a corrective purpose. 
Constitutional designers may entrench formal amendment rules not only 
to serve the conventional functions scholars attribute to these rules—to 
distinguish the constitution from ordinary law, to structure the formal 
amendment process, to precommit political actors, to make improvements 
or corrections, to heighten public awareness, to check political branches, 
to promote democracy, and to pacify constitutional change—but also to 
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express constitutional values. Constitutional designers may entrench and 
thereby express special political commitments in the rules that govern 
how the constitutional text is formally amended, for example through the 
creation of escalating or non-escalating amendment procedures or subject-
matter restrictions.  
 That formal amendment rules may express constitutional values is 
both a clarifying and a complicating contribution to the study of such 
rules. It is clarifying insofar as it illuminates a function of the rules that 
scholars have yet to fully explain and illustrate, but it is complicating 
since we cannot know from text alone whether the values entrenched in 
formal amendment rules reflect authentic or inauthentic political com-
mitments. We must therefore take a skeptical posture to any special or 
absolute entrenchment of constitutional values and inquire whether these 
formally entrenched values align in reality with a state’s political culture. 
We have seen with respect to the values entrenched in the Basic Law’s 
formal amendment rules, for example, that German constitutional en-
trenchment aligns strongly with Germany’s political culture. This align-
ment appears attributable largely to the Basic Law’s constitutional design 
and its interpretation, as well as to the popular legitimacy of the Basic 
Law’s absolute entrenchment of human dignity.  
 There remains much to study about the expressive function of formal 
amendment rules. The field of comparative constitutional law could bene-
fit from jurisdiction-specific case studies on the concordance between the 
values entrenched and expressed in formal amendment rules and those 
recognized by political actors and citizens. There are also important ques-
tions about the strategic, historical, and local reasons why constitutional 
designers choose to entrench certain constitutional values instead of oth-
ers. It may additionally be useful to inquire into the degree to which the 
values entrenched in formal amendment rules are actually vindicated in 
the judgments of national courts of last resort, to the extent that those 
values are even justiciable. These and other inquiries into the study of 
formal amendment rules hold promise for enriching the study of compara-
tive constitutional law and constitutional design. 
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